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 Passive neutron detectors, including activation foils, use neutron absorption 
reactions with known cross sections to determine a level of neutron radiation received over 
time.  Activation foils are chosen for a specific neutron measurement application based on 
their reaction probabilities cross section at various neutron energy levels and the properties 
of the activation products which result from those reactions.   
 Different activation foil nuclides have strongly varying neutron cross sections at 
different energy levels.  By selecting an appropriate set of foils, the energy dependence of 
the neutron field can be characterized and information about the spectrum and the 
magnitude of the fluence can be obtained.  For the Activation Foil Integrated Detector 
System (AFIDS), a specific set of activation wires is used to distinguish between different 
nuclear weapons detonation leakage spectra. 
 The selection of various elements for use in foils and their dimensions for AFIDS 
was initially based on informed judgement, but no rigorous optimization of the set was 
done.  Since this system could be deployed in cities nationwide, cost is a key consideration 
alongside the ability to accurately distinguish different spectra.   
 This research will provide a method to optimize both the AFIDS activation 
detectors and the cost while maintaining feasibility and reliability for this application.  A 
computer code has been developed to perform this optimization and it can be generalized 
for the use of activation detectors in many different applications and for a range of expected 
spectra. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
“No threat poses as grave a danger to our security and well-being as the potential 
use of nuclear weapons and materials by irresponsible states or terrorists.” – National 
Security Strategy, February 2015. [1] 
Nuclear weapons are one of the gravest threats to the safety and security of the 
United States.  In the past, only a few of the more technically advanced nations had the 
capacity to field such weapons potentially against the United States, and a sophisticated 
system of deterrence has evolved in the international sphere that serves to reduce the 
likelihood of a devastating nuclear exchange. 
In more recent years, nuclear proliferation has spread to more states, including the 
rogue nation of North Korea.  A small number of other nations have been working to build 
their own nuclear weapons, including those with close ties to terrorist groups.  Instead of 
simply deterring the massive Russian threat, the United States now faces multiple potential 
actors, some of which may not be as easily deterred by the US nuclear arsenal.   
A key aspect of deterrence in this new era is determining the origin of an attack.  If 
there is no missile to track from its origin, but if, for example, the nuclear explosion 
originated from a stack of cargo containers in a port facility, it is of vital interest to 
determine the origin of the weapon, as well as information about its yield, the distribution 
of radioactive effects, etc.  These nuclear forensics efforts depend on both nuclear and 
radiological analysis alongside conventional forensic and investigative techniques.  There 
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is a demand for technology and equipment that can assist in the rapid assessment of the 
nature and origin of a nuclear detonation. 
In the only cases of a nuclear weapon used against targets in wartime, the United 
States dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan in 1945.  While the 
origin and design of these weapons are known, the effects of the weapons over those city 
areas has been studied extensively for decades, incorporating a host of techniques.  One 
technique has been looking for metals that were activated by the high flux of neutrons from 
the atomic bombs.  Some of the nuclides in these materials reacted with the bomb neutrons 
to become radioactive isotopes with sufficiently long half-lives to be used as activation 
detectors following nuclear detonations to back calculate estimates of the neutron fluxes at 
various locations. These neutron fluxes can further used to compute radiation yields and 
other properties of the detonated bombs. 
To further expound on the use of isotopes of various elements as activation 
detectors, the probability of such nuclides in being transformed into radionuclides are 
directly related to their neutron cross sections.  These cross sections can be highly sensitive 
to the energies of the neutrons and vary greatly between different nuclides.  By identifying 
the residual radioactivity levels in collected samples after a detonation, for example of 
activated building materials and structural components, coupled with knowing their precise 
composition and mass as well as the time elapsed since their activation, a picture can be 
constructed of the neutron fluence in terms of magnitude, distribution in energy, and 
location with respect to the weapon detonation.   
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A problem arises – it is difficult to determine the exact composition of materials 
collected from existing infrastructure post-denotation, especially when the detonation was 
far in the past.  Suitable quantities of useful samples with activation products have to be 
located post-detonation to do such an analysis from existing infrastructure, and they may 
not be found in areas where information is needed.  A possible solution for this shortcoming 
is put forth by the Activation Foil Integrated Detector System (AFIDS), developed at Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory over the past decade.  This system of activation detection 
assemblies would be deployed prior to any event and left in place.  Pictures of a previous 
AFIDS detector prototype are in Figure 1; the current distribution of target activation 
foils/wires is in Figure 2.  
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Figure 1 - PVC Model of AFIDS Detector Body (previous design iteration) 
 
Figure 2 - Current target foil/wire configuration 
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The AFIDS detector solves the composition, mass, and lack of useful element 
issues of the activation analysis by deliberately placing high-purity metal activation foils 
in locations spread out in a potential target area.  Since the composition, mass, and location 
of each target material is well-known, in the event of a nuclear detonation, the level of 
radioactivity present (due to neutron activation) would provide high-quality data that can 
be used by the Oak Ridge-developed SLEUTH1 algorithm to determine a best fit for the 
nuclear weapon’s leakage spectra.  A screenshot of this code in Figure 3 shows how 
detectors may be arrayed in different locations to help piece together the event. 
                                                 
 
1 The SLEUTH code has been superseded with newer codes, but the underlying processes 
are the same, and the screenshot is the best available illustration of the concept. 
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Figure 3 - Screenshot of SLEUTH Code 
 
 
In the AFIDS approach to neutron detection, the neutrons activate metals and the 
resulting isotopes give off gamma-ray radiation over time as they decay.  Gammas are 
easily counted by high purity germanium (HPGe) detectors, and their energies can be 
determined with high resolution by an HPGe detector.  The activation nuclear reactions are 
generally well-characterized and available through the data libraries such as those in the 
SCALE code package.2 
                                                 
 
2 Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation.  The SCALE code system is 
a widely used modeling and simulation suite for nuclear safety analysis and design that is 
 7 
While the original AFIDS detector underwent some initial radiation testing, several 
issues arose.  The PVC holder had to be replaced with a different material due to the 
production of long-lived radioactive chlorine in the holder material. Aluminum is the 
currently proposed holder material and due for testing.  Further, the choice of activation 
detector materials was not optimized to maximize the ability to differentiate between 
various nuclear weapon leakage spectra at a variety of times post-denotation while meeting 
cost constraints.  This research presented herein is focused on this optimization and 
developing algorithms to both meet the needs of the AFIDS project and for general 
applications of activation detectors. 
1.1 Objectives of Research 
1.1.1 Primary Objectives 
The primary objectives of the research presented in this dissertation were: 
1. Creation of an algorithm for optimizing the selection of activation foil/wire 
materials for the AFIDS setup based on the ability to distinguish between bomb 
leakage spectra, provide activation products at sufficiently high levels coupled 
with adequate half-lives to count at various decay times post-event, and purchased 
at reasonable costs.  Code the algorithm from objective 1 into a stand-alone, well-
                                                 
 
developed, maintained, tested, and managed by the Reactor and Nuclear Systems 
Division (RNSD) of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL).  More information is 
available at https://www.ornl.gov/scale/overview. 
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documented software package with documented input (to include leakage spectra 
to be distinguished between, physical and nuclear properties of materials, etc.) 
2. Optimize the current AFIDS design against unclassified nuclear weapons leakage 
spectra subject to cost goals. 
1.1.2 Secondary Objectives 
The effort presented in the dissertation had secondary objectives which include: 
1. Experimentally validate the current AFIDS prototype against existing 
activation/count rate predictions and radiation transport modeling.   
2. Test the effects of different alloys of aluminum on the current AFIDS prototype, 
with the goal of reducing cost if less expensive aluminum alloys are suitable. 
3. Test the effects of varying size of target rods and/or using multiple copies of the 
same elemental rod. 
4. Capture lessons learned from the experimental validation for future studies. 
1.2 Relation to the Longer-Term AFIDS Project 
One of the primary objectives of this research is to optimize the current AFIDS 
design’s ability to discriminate between nuclear weapons leakage spectra subject to 
practical cost constraints. 
The initial AFIDS design was completed during 2006 and refined in 2008 after 
experimentation was constrained by budget and time.  The researchers at the time state “No 
optimization was performed to determine if all these wires were needed, if high purity was 
required, or whether PVC was the most optimum holder material.” [2]  It has since been 
 9 
determined that PVC is not a feasible holder material due to radioactive chlorine 
byproducts when PVC is irradiated with neutrons.  This research lead to modifications in 
the original design to optimize it and create an algorithm to allow computer-based 
optimization against different leakage spectra and constraints. 
The initial elements selected for wires considered by the AFIDS team were based 
on experience, cost, and the availability.  However, the 16 elements considered are only a 
small breadth of the practical search space that exceeds 70 elements once a few practical 
filters are applied.3  By leveraging a computer-based approach, a much larger search space 
can be comprehensively checked for desirable combination of cross section plus activation 
levels versus energy and cost.4  Further, a set of elements may be pieced together that 
covers a range of energy levels and decay times in a way that would be very labor intensive 
to do by hand.  Solving this problem with specific constraints by investigating all 
combinations exhaustively is not feasible within reasonable computation times.5 
A secondary objective of the research was to experimentally validate the current 
AFIDS prototype against the modeling previously carried out and done in more detail 
                                                 
 
3 These filters include minimum melting points and the exclusion of transuranic elements.  
Elements that are gases or liquids at room temperature were not considered; however, 
elements like carbon with a solid form at room temperature were considered.  Chemical 
compounds have not yet been considered; this may be a way to take advantage of low 
melting point elements that have suitable nuclear properties. 
4 The AFIDS work focuses on lower-yield nuclear weapons, in the low kt to ~20 kt range, 
with detectors optimized against activity levels resulting after transport from such 
weapons. 
5 The 27 commercially-available elements to be distributed between 20 available slots in 
the detector body create over 1028 combinations that would need to be compared. 
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during this research.  Several simplifying assumptions were made in the initial modeling 
based on the geometry of the holder and the target wires.  These assumptions include that 
the effects of self-shielding are negligible for materials that are relatively thin, and, 
similarly, that the effects of down-scattering on the incoming flux spectra are negligible 
within the detector itself since a low proportion of neutrons will have interactions with the 
detector or holder.  After testing during this research, the decision was made to add fidelity 
to the model to account for detector shielding and angular effects. 
Additionally, two different aluminum alloys were tested as the replacement for 
PVC for the holder in this work.  Aluminum-1100 is a commercial high-purity alloy (99%+ 
Al) and aluminum-6061 is a more commonly produced alloy (~98.5%).  The research will 
determine the difference in flux at the target rod locations between holders made of the two 
different alloys, with a goal of informing whether the less expensive aluminum-6061 is 
suitable for detection purposes. 
1.3 Relation to Present State of Knowledge and Other Current Research 
 This research is related to the field of neutron activation analysis commonly used 
to identify elements in a given sample by bombarding the material to be tested with 
neutrons (of known energy distribution and quantity) and measuring resulting 
radioactivity.  However, this research, as well as the AFIDS project, works the problem in 
the opposite direction – given well-known materials and locations, it attempts to determine 
the incoming neutron flux spectra. 
There are standard methods for characterizing fluence based on activations outlined 
in American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) International Standards 261 
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(general) [3] and 526 [4] (specifically for higher energy neutrons).  Those techniques only 
seek to find neutron fluence in very broad energy spectral ranges (epithermal, thermal, over 
4.4 MeV, etc.) which is not enough to distinguish between nuclear weapon types.  These 
standards are useful for outlining an experimental approach and listing potential sources of 
error to watch for in the larger search space. 
 Similar work to this was conducted in Japan after the atomic bombings at the end 
of World War II. [5]  Even decades later, low-level residual radiation has been used to 
characterize the neutron flux from the weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  Part 
of the difficulty of this work is finding sufficient quantities of useful materials with 
appropriate compositions in the places that they are needed to generate a complete picture 
of the dose received over the cities.   
The AFIDS project seeks to turn this weakness in the process into a strength by 
placing high purity, well-characterized target materials at specified locations in an array 
that can be used post-blast to quickly provide information about yield and the neutron 
energy spectrum of the fluence.  These pieces of information can significantly inform 
nuclear forensic analysis and attribution. [2] 
The AFIDS project currently uses an Oak Ridge National Laboratory-developed 
code-named SLEUTH to interpret the results of the AFIDS detector’s target foils.  It 
accounts for the distance from ground zero of each detector and can adjust the count rates 
by accounting for expected shaping of the flux spectra due to the local surroundings, 
especially in an urban environment.  It then uses the count rates to determine a best fit for 
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the weapon’s initial leakage spectrum, based on defined candidate spectra.  The code uses 
a chi-squared goodness-of-fit test to select the best estimate. 
Part of this research investigates an optimization of the system, with the goal of 
maximizing the target array’s ability to discriminate between possible starting leakage 
spectra with the highest certainty possible.  There is literature describing using the chi-
squared test to best fit models, but there is not research readily available on working the 
problem in reverse – optimizing the choice of data sources to increase the ability to 
discriminate between competing data sets. 
While the AFIDS project is not exclusively designed as a nuclear forensics tool (it 
is useful for consequence management and medical response planning, for instance), it 
complements other capabilities in this by its unique nature.  It is a passive design that will 
be a very low-cost, deployable system with almost no maintenance requirements or 
maintenance costs.  This will let it be deployed widely in a way that active detection 
systems cannot.  Since it does not depend on a power supply or sophisticated circuitry, but 
fundamental physics, it cannot fail unless it is melted or rendered irretrievable.  (Some of 
the detectors closest to the blast are likely to be melted, but having an affordable large array 
mitigates this.)   
By providing gamma spectra upon being counted, the retrieval of the activation 
levels is based on well-developed methods. In addition, the data would still be useful in the 
events that errors in modeling are later uncovered or better techniques for reconstructing 
the spectra from the activation data are developed.  At least one target wire should have a 
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sufficiently long half-life to leave the door open for researchers to do first-hand analysis 
with improved equipment years after the fact. 
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Neutron Activation Analysis 
 Neutron activation analysis (NAA) is the process of determining information about 
a spectrum of neutrons (quantities and energy distribution) indirectly by counting the 
gamma rays emitted by the activation products the neutrons create when they interact with 
target materials.  The neutrons interact with matter in different ways, including being 
captured or scattered.  Typical reactions are (n,) for an incoming neutron being captured 
with an immediate gamma ray being released; (n,p) for an incoming neutron being captured 
and a proton being released; (n,n’) for a scattering event, where the neutron exits with a 
different energy level than the incoming; and (n,) where the incoming neutron leads to an 
alpha particle being released.  There are more complex reactions as well. 
2.1.1 Determining Activation Probabilities 
 The likelihood of any of these reactions depends on the cross section neutron cross 
section of the material targeted.  The cross sections are dependent on the energy of the 
incoming neutrons, and many reactions possess resonance locations in the interaction 
probability where reactions are much more likely to occur.  In this research, cross sections 
binned into 200 energy groups from the SCALE package are generally used.  The cross 
sections are also dependent not only on element but on the individual isotopes of that 
element.  Different isotopes of the same element can have very different cross sections due 
to the physics inside of the nucleus. 
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 As reactions occur, the material becomes activated, meaning it has been 
transformed by the reaction into different isotopes (and sometimes different elements) that 
are now radioactive.  Generally speaking, only a very small portion of the atoms present 
activate, while the vast majority remain the original isotope.  This is important because it 
is an underlying assumption in this work that the burnup of the original isotope is so small 
as to be neglected when calculating the estimated number of reactions. 
2.1.2 Decay of Activation Products 
 The activated isotopes are normally radioactive and decay subsequent to their 
creation.  The half-lives of these decays vary from sub-microseconds to hundreds of years 
or more.  Longer lived activation products will be slow to decay and lead to fewer gamma-
ray emissions per unit time and subsequently a lower count rate when the activation 
detector is counted.  Short lived activation products decay quickly but lead to high count 
rates if they can be counted after decay times on the order of multiples of their half-lives. 
 When the radioactive activation product decays, it emits a gamma ray (sometimes 
indirectly, in the case of positron emission leading to an annihilation event that produces a 
gamma ray).  The gamma ray emitted is not correlated with the original neutron energy.  
Also, a single activation product may have many gamma-ray energies it can emit 
depending on different transitions in the nucleus as it decays.  These gamma ray yields 
have fixed probabilities for a given radionuclide referred to as branching ratios. 
2.1.3 Gamma Ray Counting 
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 For the gamma rays to be counted in a detector, they must first escape the original 
target material.  As previously stated, the burnup of the original nuclides of which the 
activation detector is composed is unchanged in a practical sense.  So, the attenuation of 
emitted gamma rays from the activation detectors can be assumed to be the original 
material composition.  The attenuation coefficients needed to perform this escape 
calculation is dependent on the energy of the emitted gamma ray and the target material 
composition.  Since the position at which the gamma rays are emitted are random (as well 
as their direction of travel), transport simulations are performed for specific geometries to 
determine the likelihood of escape, called the escape probability. 
 To be detected, the gamma ray must encounter the gamma detector’s active volume.  
This probability is based on the relative positioning and sizes of the activated target rod 
and the detector.  It is called the geometric efficiency.  Finally, the gamma ray must interact 
within the detector active volume, depositing its energy to create a signal.  Higher energy 
gammas tend to have a higher probability of escaping their original material but are also 
likely to be harder for the detector to capture and count. 
 The combined geometric efficiency and the likelihood of a gamma that interacts 
with the detector volume being counted is called the absolute efficiency of the detector.  
This quantity is dependent on the energy of the gammas.  A calibration must be completed 
to determine the absolute efficiency as a function of energy for a set activation material 
geometry and detector setup. 
 Distinguishing between gamma rays of different energies is important.  It provides 
knowledge about which reactions are causing the gamma rays.  The ability to distinguish 
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energy levels is a property of the detector setup called energy resolution.  High energy 
resolution detector setups like HPGe detectors can separate gamma energies down to keV 
levels.  There are tradeoffs – lower energy resolution detectors like sodium iodine crystals 
lack the same energy resolution but provide higher absolute efficiencies. 
 Some activation reactions that result from different nuclides can lead to the same 
activation product isotope (with the same gamma-ray branching ratios).  This is 
problematic if the two different reactions start from the same element, and both reactions 
are somewhat likely to occur.  Since the two target nuclides have different cross sections, 
it is impossible to figure out how many of the counted gamma rays are due to one nuclide 
or the other.  This is called interference, and if the levels are high enough, both candidate 
reactions are unusable.  A similar case can happen when the activation products are 
different but have emitted gamma rays that are very close in energy, sufficiently close that 
they cannot be resolved from each other, causing close peak interference.  These 
interference situations are fairly rare but must be accounted for. 
2.1.4 Neutron Activation Analysis of Nuclear Weapons Leakage Spectra 
 NAA is particularly suited for analysis of nuclear weapons leakage spectra, which 
consists of the distribution of neutrons that escape the nuclear explosion and any casing or 
delivery materials to interact with the surrounding environment.  NAA has the advantage 
of not requiring powered counting equipment to be in place during the time of the neutron 
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flux is present.6  Not only is this less expensive, but there is no risk of the nuclear 
electromagnetic pulse effects damaging the counting electronics or making the stored data 
unrecoverable. 
 NAA can be conducted on materials generally available in the environment around 
a nuclear detonation, most notably performed as part of the long-term studies of the effects 
of the two nuclear weapons detonated in Japan near the end of World War II. [5] [6]  For 
studying the dose effects on the populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, NAA was used 
on select materials, such as europium, found in small quantities in silica rocks in the area. 
[7]  Due to the 12.5 year half-life of the 152Eu activation product, good counting statistics 
were still available more than 40 years after the explosions. 
 To do this research in Japan, the small amounts of europium had to be found and 
isolated from the rock samples. [7]  This required sophisticated chemistry equipment and, 
importantly, a lot of time.  The quantities involved had to be carefully measured to ensure 
a correct baseline for determining original activation levels. 
 The idea behind the AFIDS project [2] and similar detector systems [8] is to 
eliminate the time and cost of finding the materials best able to produce countable 
activation products for NAA by prepositioning intentionally selected materials in known 
locations in well-characterized geometries and purities.  This would allow NAA to be 
                                                 
 
6 For nuclear weapons, the surge of neutron emissions occurs in such a short time as to be 
instantaneous for purposes of modeling activations and radioactive decay.  As such, 
references will be made to the total fluence – the time-integrated flux. 
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conducted in a much shorter timeframe and guarantees availability of needed target 
materials for activation in sufficient quantities.   
 The output of NAA for these nuclear forensics applications is information about 
the original nuclear weapon neutron leakage spectra.  Rather than trying to unfold the 
spectrum directly, the count data from the activation products are used to calculate the 
number of activations in the target material immediately after the event.  Then a set of 
library comparison nuclear weapon neutron leakage spectra are used as inputs to the Monte 
Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) transport code which models what the fluence striking each 
detector location would be for that spectrum.   
 That fluence is used to calculate the number of expected initial activations for each 
detector location and target element.  The library spectra are scaled to 1 kt of yield and 
have an associated number of neutrons produced per kt.  This allows a matching algorithm 
to scale the yield of the library spectra to find the best fit for all of the countable 
element/detector location combinations, resulting in a chi-squared matching score. [8] The 
yield scaling factor itself provides valuable information; a rough yield estimate would be 
known and if the yield scaling factor for a library spectrum were wildly different than the 
estimate, that spectrum would not be a good match. 
2.2 Source Spectra 
2.2.1 Limitations 
The source spectra used in this dissertation are unclassified.  This limits the spectra 
available to five weapons: 
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• “Little Boy”, the gun-type uranium fission weapon dropped on Hiroshima; 
• “Fat Man”, the implosion plutonium fission weapon dropped on Nagasaki; 
• “Fusion”, which is a hypothetical pure deuterium-tritium fusion device 
outputting only 14.1 MeV neutrons;  
• “Watt-Uranium”, the Watt spectrum for U-235 fission; and 
•  “Watt-Plutonium”, the Watt spectrum for Pu-239 fission.   
The spectra will be addressed in alphabetical order in most cases, and the following 
abbreviations will be used for conciseness: “FM” for “Fat Man”, “FUS” for “Fusion”, “LB” 
for “Little Boy”, “WPu” for “Watt-Plutonium” and “WU” for “Watt-Uranium”.  The five 




Figure 4 – Neutron Leakage Spectra, Probability vs. Energy (MeV) 
 
Note the Fusion spectrum is a pure 14.1 MeV source, denoted by the single red line at the 
right side of the graph. 
The analysis techniques and code written for this dissertation are carefully designed 
to work with a far larger data set than five spectra, to allow analysis of much larger library 
of spectra, if required.  Test runs with up to 125 library and unknown spectra (25 repeats 
of same 5 unclassified spectra) were conducted successfully. 
2.2.2  “Fat Man” Spectrum 
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The “Fat Man” nuclear weapon was an aircraft-delivered bomb dropped on 
Nagasaki, Japan on 9 August 1945.  It was the second and currently last nuclear weapon 
denotated in war.  The implosion design created a supercritical mass of Pu-239 by using 
shape charges to compress the “physics package” containing a spherical subcritical mass 
of plutonium and other components.  The bomb casing and guidance systems were robust 
– the weapon weighed 4,700 kg.  This affects the neutron leakage spectrum by increased 
attenuation. 
The neutron leakage spectrum used for this research is based on the Dosimetry 
System 2002 (DS02) calculations performed for the re-evaluation of the doses to Japanese 
atomic bomb survivors. [6]  This spectrum features a large number of relatively low energy 
neutrons, and a sharp cut off just over 10 MeV.  It has no fusion component.  Compared to 
“Little Boy”, this spectrum has a higher neutron concentration near a broad peak around 
10-4 MeV.  So, the spectrum has been significantly moderated. 
2.2.3 “Fusion” Spectrum 
The “Fusion” neutron leakage spectrum is not based on a real-world weapon design.  
It is a hypothetical weapon based solely on the deuterium-tritium fusion reaction, with a 
sharp 14.1 MeV peak.  Real-world fusion weapons are initiated with fission physics 
packages and can also be multistage devices.  None of this is captured in this spectrum.  
However, it serves as a way to determine the utility of a given element in detecting fusion 
weapon signatures. 
2.2.4 “Little Boy” Spectrum 
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The “Little Boy” nuclear weapon was an aircraft-delivered bomb dropped on 
Hiroshima, Japan on 6 August 1945.  It was first nuclear weapon detonated in war.  The 
gun-type design created a supercritical mass of U-235 by using explosives to push one 
mass down a tube into contact with the other.  Like the World War II era “Fat Man”, the 
“Little Boy” bomb casing and guidance systems were robust – the weapon weighed 4,400 
kg.  This affects the neutron leakage spectrum by increased attenuation. 
The neutron leakage spectrum used for this research is based on the DS02 
calculations. [6]  This spectrum features the widest spread of neutron energies of the five 
test spectra, with a very broad peak centered around 50 keV and a sharp cut off just over 
10 MeV.  The spectrum has a lot of structure due to resonances and minima of the materials 
surrounding the warhead.  It has no fusion component.  This spectrum also produces the 
fewest neutrons per kt.  This makes it relatively difficult to get sufficient detector counts 
for this spectrum. 
2.2.5 “Watt-Plutonium” and “Watt-Uranium” Spectra 
These two spectra are generated from the empirical Watt distribution. [9] The 











f(ε) ≡ Probability distribution function, energy dependent.  [Calculated quantity] 
a, b ≡ Empirical parameters 
ε ≡ Energy, MeV 
 The parameters a and b vary with the fissionable isotope (and weakly with 
incoming neutron energy.) [11]  The Watt spectra of U-235 and Pu-239 are very similar 
over much of the energy range considered.  This challenges the AFIDS modeling to 
distinguish between two closely-related weapon types, separated only by selection of fissile 
isotope – an important distinction when determining the design and possible origin of a 
weapon.  The differences between the spectra are illustrated in Figure 5 below: 
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Figure 5 – Ratio of Watt-Pu:Watt-U Neutron Leakage Spectra 
 
 The Watt-U spectrum is more likely to produce neutrons in all the lower energy 
bins up until 2.3 MeV, where the Watt-Pu breaks even as it skews upwards to higher 
neutron energy levels.  Elements featuring threshold reactions are expected to do well in 
distinguishing these two spectra.  In the default scenario defined shortly, these are the two 
most difficult spectra to distinguish. 
2.3 Default Scenario Parameters 
 The optimal selection and arrangement of elements for the AFIDS detectors 
depends on the scenarios that its design is optimized for.  For instance, if the design 
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assumed that it would only be required to distinguish between low-sophistication fission-
only device designs expected from a terrorist threat, the optimization process would likely 
favor elements sensitive to neutrons below the telltale deuterium-tritium 14.1 MeV peak.  
If the design solely sought to determine if a weapon had a fusion component, it may choose 
elements that are most effective at capturing that peak.  Similar circumstances arise when 
considering low-yield versus high-yield weapons. 
 This research split most of these differences in trying to optimize the detector to 
handle a wide variety of scenarios while limiting the cost per detector, with a working limit 
of $250 in material cost per unit.  The default scenario parameters outlined below will 
reflect this.  Many of these parameters will be altered in the different tests subsequently 
run to test for both feasibility and sensitivity to these values. 
 The default scenario parameters are: 
 Yield = 15.0 kt 
 Delay time before starting counts = 72.0 hours 
 Counting time allowed, per element = 3.0 hours 
 Minimum counts required = 3,000 
 Terrain: New York City 
 Ground zero and detector locations: illustrated in Figure 6, with ground zero 
colored red.  There are differences in height not pictured. 
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 Elements: Only consider commercially-available elements with melting points 
greater than or equal to aluminum. 
 
 
Figure 6 – Detector and Ground Zero Locations, NYC MCNP Model.  (3 km x 3 km, 
500 m gridlines, blue dots = detectors, red dot = detonation at Times Square) [2] 
 
 The default yield is similar to the Little Boy gun-type device that is a likely choice 
for a terrorist attack.  It is also not too far from an implosion-type device that is purely 
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fission in nature.  Higher yields lead to proportionately more neutrons which increases 
count rates and eases detection and distinguishing spectra, so the default yield is biased 
towards the more challenging scenarios involving low-yield weapons. 
 The delay time in the start of counting is based on judgment about how quickly 
detectors may be retrieved after a nuclear event.  The detectors must also either be 
transported to a counting lab or be counted by a mobile counting lab.  This parameter will 
be altered in the study to see which elements produce a longer-lasting signal, which is 
useful if the collection time exceeds 72 hours. 
 The counting time allowed accounts for the scarce resource of counting equipment 
anticipated immediately after a nuclear event and the need to provide useful results quickly.  
An optimized contingency plan may set different counting times for different elements to 
further leverage these limited resources, but this must be part of a larger plan that is beyond 
the scope of this work. 
 The required counts parameter reflects the desire to reduce the statistical 
uncertainty to an acceptable level and is a trade-off between uncertainty and time.  The 
statistical uncertainty is proportionate to the square root of the number of counts, leading 
to diminishing returns for higher count requirements. 
 The selection of New York City with a detector spacing of 500 meters in a grid 
pattern is shown in Figure 6.  New York was selected because of its high density of tall 
buildings that create urban canyons and lots of attenuation.  This is one of the most 
challenging situations to get sufficient counts in and is also a very high-profile target.  The 
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500-meter detector spacing is based on previous work done in the AFIDS research and 
design. [2] 
 Elements who are not commercially available or whose melting points are below 
that of aluminum will be filtered out.  This filtering limits the search space to those 
elements feasible for use in this application.  Materials that melt before the aluminum 
container will be uncountable and materials that are not commercially available will exceed 
the cost constraints of the project. 
  
 30 
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
The primary approach to determining the optimal set of target activation detectors 
(target rods) is to model the expected activation of the target rods in computer codes, then 
conduct analysis to determine which rods contribute the most to differentiating between 
the library spectra.  To do this, the neutron source (leakage) spectra are transported in the 
Monte Carlo code (MCNP) to detector locations in modelled terrain.7   This incoming 
fluence is then used to calculate expected activation levels for each of the target rods at 
each of detector locations, 34 for this work.  The initial activation levels are then decayed 
to allow for the delay in collection and the start of counting, and their expected count rates 
are calculated.  The details of these calculations and processes are outlined in section 3.1. 
There are several key assumptions made for this series of models and calculations 
which are outlined specifically in section 3.1.1.  A series of experiments was executed to 
test the validity of some of these assumptions and that methodology is outlined in section 
3.2. 
Fundamental to the analysis of the results is the match chi-squared score.  This 
score compares how similar a given library and unknown spectra are statistically and also 
                                                 
 
7 For this research, a model of New York City is used exclusively, though the codes and 
methods work are agnostic to that choice.  New York has pronounced urban canyons that 
create interesting angular distributions of the neutron fluence. 
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determines a scaling factor that represents the required yield of the unknown spectrum to 
produce the closest match.  The matching process is detailed starting in section 3.3.1. 
3.1 Modeling Activations, Decay, and Counting 
This section will lay out the major equations used in modeling activations, decay, 
and counts detected, including assumptions made, inputs used, and special considerations.  
The code used to model will be discussed in section 3.2. 
3.1.1 Assumptions 
3.1.1.1 Self-shielding impact of target rods 
The target rods are 1.0 mm in diameter.  To simplify calculations, it was initially 
assumed that effectively 100% of the gamma rays emitted during radioactive decay of the 
activated nuclei would escape the rod itself.  In other words, the number of gamma rays 
leaving the rod was unaffected by the small amount of intervening material.  This 
simplified the efficiency calculation of the gamma-ray detector by limiting it to the 
geometric factor and the energy efficiency of the detector for each gamma ray. 
This assumption turned out to be invalid, as some low energy gamma rays are 
strongly attenuated by the target rod material and many gamma rays key to the analysis 
had significant attenuation in the rod.  The testing of this assumption is outlined in section 
4.1.1.1.  This assumption was not used in final calculations; an escape factor for each 
gamma ray / target rod combination was calculated and used. 
3.1.1.2 Impact of Shielding of the Rods by the Walls of the Holder 
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The aluminum detector body’s cylindrical wire holder is 0.476 cm thick.  The 
amount of aluminum holder material between a target rod and a neutron source varies with 
orientation and is 0.188 cm for a rod directly facing the source versus 0.664 cm for a rod 
just offset from the opposite side.  Previous AFIDS work modelled these situations in 
MCNP and calculated a net change in activations of less than 4% from a bare target rod 
(no holder) setup. [2]  This modeling work was tested by experiment and additional 
modeling which is detailed in section 4.1. 
3.1.1.3 Impact of the Orientation of the Detector Body 
This assumption is related to the previous assumption but is listed separately 
because it may be valid even if the previous assumption is not valid.  Previous AFIDS work 
showed a very small angular dependence on activations with an aluminum holder, which 
is one of the major reasons the material was selected.  However, the modeling in the 
previous work focused on two target rod reactions; experimental tests which are outlined 
in section 4.1.1.2.3 will test for a variety of target rod materials with different neutron 
activation cross sections (as a function of neutron energy). 
3.1.1.4 The Dominant Uncertainty in Predicted Initial Activations: Neutron Fluence 
There are multiple variables with associated uncertainties in equation (2) used to 
calculate predicted (library) activations.  Most of these quantities have very small relative 
uncertainties compared to the statistical uncertainty resulting from the MCNP transport 
modeling, with the exception of the uncertainty in gamma ray counts.  For the library 
spectra, the MCNP transport uncertainty should dominate; for the unknown spectra, the 
counting uncertainty should dominate. 
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3.1.2 Algorithm Development 
This section outlines the major equations and variables used to model target rod 
activations, their subsequent counting and the chi-squared matching analysis. 
3.1.2.1 Library Activations 
The number of activations is calculated in a target rod for a given reaction using 
equation (2): 
 
𝑁𝑎𝑐𝑡 = Φ𝐸 ∗ ⁡σ𝐸 ∗ (
𝑚 ∗ 𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝐴
) ∗ 𝑁𝐴 (2) 
Where: 
Nact ≡ number of activated nuclei for a given reaction present in the target rod due 
to the brief fluence from the detonation event, in a given energy bin.  [Calculated quantity] 
ΦE ≡ incoming neutron fluence from a selected energy bin at the target rod location, 
neutrons per cm2. 
 σE ≡ the effective microscopic cross section from a selected energy bin for the 
specific desired reaction, barns (10-24 cm2). 
 m ≡ mass of the target rod, calculated from its density and volume, grams. 
 Abundance ≡ fraction of total mass of an element mass that is the specific desired 
isotope. 
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 A ≡ average atomic weight of the element of the target material (isotope specific), 
grams/mole. 
 NA ≡ Avogadro’s Number: number of atoms per mole. 
3.1.2.2 Decay of Activated Products 
The number of activation product nuclei left as a function of time after its creation 
is calculated with the radioactive decay equation: 
 𝑁(𝑡) = 𝑁𝑎𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡 (3) 
Where: 
N(t) ≡ Number of activated atoms at a given time [Calculated quantity] 
Nact ≡ Number of activated atoms at time zero, previously calculated.  The is the 
number of atoms of the activation product immediately present after the weapon 
detonation. 
λ ≡ Decay constant of the product isotope of interest, hour-1 
t ≡ Time, hours 
3.1.2.3 Count Rate 
The count rate equation is the time derivative of the decay equation multiplied by 
several terms accounting for the expected number of gammas per decay and the absolute 
efficiency of the gamma ray detector at a given energy level. 
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 𝐶(𝑡) = 𝜆𝑁(𝑡) ∗
𝛾
𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑦
∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑐 ∗ 𝜀𝑎𝑏𝑠 (4) 
Where: 
C(t) ≡ Count rate at a given time, hour-1.  [Calculated quantity] 
λ ≡ Decay constan, hour-1 
N(t) ≡ Number of activated atoms at a given time 
γ/decay ≡ Number of gamma rays emitted per decay event; only including gamma 
rays from the best gamma ray selected 
pesc ≡ Probability that a given gamma ray escapes from the target rod 
εabs ≡ Absolute efficiency of the detector for the chosen gamma ray 
3.2 Modeling and Analysis Code 
This section describes the overall set of FORTRAN codes that model the 
activations of target rods from a given set of library and unknown (perturbed) spectra.  The 
unknown spectra represent the data that would be collected by the counting process after a 
nuclear event and are generated by taking the library spectra, perturbing them based on 
their uncertainty using a randomly-sampled gaussian distribution, and calculating the 
associated activation levels, decays over time, and final number of counts.  This process 
leads to filters that eliminate elements that do not produce enough counts for good counting 
 36 
statistics.  The uncertainty for the unknown spectra also follows along this chain of 
calculations. 
The code determines the radioactive decay rates and amounts, determines the 
optimal reactions and gamma rays to measure, and calculates predicated count rates and 
total counts for a given set of target rods and locations.  Many key parameters are adjustable 
to run different scenarios and compare results.  The scoring and analysis portions of the 
code are covered separately in section 3.3.2. 
3.2.1 Overall Modeling Code Structure 
The overview of the code structure is covered in Figure 7: 
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Figure 7 – Overall Code Structure 
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The seven subprograms are highlighted in blue; the first six will be discussed in 
this section, and the final scoring and analysis program will be discussed in section 3.3.  
The first subprogram discussed, the Gamma Escape code, is somewhat standalone in the 
sense that it only needs to be ran one time to generate needed input for the rest of the 
subprograms.  Its output does not vary with the numerous parameters that are adjustable in 
the overall code. 
3.2.2 Subprogram Descriptions and Key Algorithms 
3.2.2.1 Gamma Escape Probability 
This subprogram calculates the probability of a gamma ray of a given energy level 
escaping from an elementally-pure target rod of a given element.  The input data for this 
subprogram include the energy-dependent cross sections for gamma rays for each element, 
sourced from the National Institute for Standards and Measures’ Physical Measurement 
Laboratory [12].  The program also refers to basic elemental physical data, such as density. 
The calculations for each element are independent.  Thus, the code also allows 
command line inputs for which elements to run, allowing for simple parallelization on 
multi-processor-core computers, which reduced the local runtime by a factor of ten. 
This subprogram assumes that the gamma ray emissions (also the location of 
activated nuclei and decay events) are uniformly distributed in position.  It is also assumed 
that the gamma ray emissions are isotropic in angle.  Finally, any gamma ray interaction 
with the target rod is considered a non-escape event and the particle is dropped from 
consideration. 
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After reading in the input data, including the number of energy bins for each 
element in the gamma ray cross section data, the subprogram determines if a file containing 
pre-calculated pathlengths exists.  (These pathlengths only depend on the target rod 
geometry, and considerable computational time is saved by calculating a large number of 
them once upfront.)  If the pathlength file does exist, the subprogram skips the next 
paragraph. 
The subprogram then selects a random starting position8, azimuthal angle, and polar 
angle for a gamma ray. It then calculates the path length covered until the ray would 
intersect either the cylindrical edge or end cap of the cylinder and selects the smaller of 
these two values as the path length and appends it to the pathlength file.  The subprogram 
repeats this random generation / pathlength calculation until 3.0E+9 pathlengths are 
generated and appended to the pathlength file.9 
The subprogram then loads the pathlength file.  Then, for each element considered, 
and for each energy bin within the cross section data for that element, the subprogram 
calculates the escape probability for a pathlength, and maintains a running uncertainty level 
for all pathlengths tested so far.  If the uncertainty is less than the maximum allowed, or 
the maximum number of pathlengths is reached, the subprogram moves on to the next 
                                                 
 
8 Care must be taken to get a uniform distribution in a cylinder; the code uniformly 
distributes over a square cross section then throws out starting positions outside the 
radius of the cylinder.  Similar care must be taken in sampling of starting angles. 
9 This number is an empirically-determined compromise between run time, memory 
available, and uncertainty reduction possible for given element/energy level escape 
probability calculations.  Most combinations will converge in far fewer iterations. 
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element / energy bin combination.10  When all elements are completed, the gamma escape 
probability data are saved in both comma-delimited and binary formats. 
The output product for this code is a lookup table of escape probabilities for a given 
gamma-ray energy and element combination from the common geometry of the target rods.  
Later codes will use linear interpolation for gamma rays that do not match one of the energy 
level entries from the cross section database.  An excerpt from the escape probabilities of 
a gamma ray from iron are shown in Table 1:  
  
                                                 
 
10 To speed up the actual code, this test is not conducted for the first 10,000 pathlength 
iterations, and then only checked every 10,000 iterations thereafter. 
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Table 1 – Excerpt of Gamma Escape Probabilities for Iron 








1.00E-03 1.41E-04 1.53E-07 1.09E-03 3.00E+09 
1.50E-03 3.77E-04 3.77E-07 1.00E-03 1.32E+09 
2.00E-03 7.90E-04 7.90E-07 1.00E-03 6.32E+08 
3.00E-03 2.31E-03 2.31E-06 1.00E-03 2.15E+08 
4.00E-03 5.05E-03 5.05E-06 1.00E-03 9.80E+07 
5.00E-03 9.34E-03 9.34E-06 1.00E-03 5.26E+07 
6.00E-03 1.55E-02 1.55E-05 1.00E-03 3.13E+07 
7.11E-03 2.49E-02 2.49E-05 1.00E-03 1.91E+07 
7.11E-03 3.16E-03 3.16E-06 1.00E-03 1.57E+08 
8.00E-03 4.22E-03 4.22E-06 1.00E-03 1.18E+08 
1.00E-02 7.56E-03 7.56E-06 1.00E-03 6.51E+07 
1.50E-02 2.27E-02 2.27E-05 1.00E-03 2.10E+07 
2.00E-02 5.07E-02 5.07E-05 1.00E-03 8.87E+06 
3.00E-02 1.58E-01 1.58E-04 1.00E-03 2.21E+06 
4.00E-02 3.28E-01 2.69E-04 8.21E-04 1.00E+06 
5.00E-02 4.99E-01 2.52E-04 5.04E-04 1.00E+06 
6.00E-02 6.31E-01 2.16E-04 3.43E-04 1.00E+06 
8.00E-02 7.84E-01 4.87E-04 6.21E-04 1.00E+05 
1.00E-01 8.55E-01 3.67E-04 4.29E-04 1.00E+05 
1.50E-01 9.17E-01 2.40E-04 2.62E-04 1.00E+05 
2.00E-01 9.35E-01 1.96E-04 2.10E-04 1.00E+05 
3.00E-01 9.49E-01 1.62E-04 1.70E-04 1.00E+05 
4.00E-01 9.56E-01 1.45E-04 1.52E-04 1.00E+05 
5.00E-01 9.60E-01 1.34E-04 1.39E-04 1.00E+05 
6.00E-01 9.63E-01 1.25E-04 1.30E-04 1.00E+05 
8.00E-01 9.67E-01 1.12E-04 1.16E-04 1.00E+05 
1.00E+00 9.71E-01 1.02E-04 1.06E-04 1.00E+05 
 
 The goal for reducing the relative uncertainty for each energy level was 1.E-3, 
subject to running out of pathlengths to use to continue reducing the uncertainty.  Note the 
very low energy bins where the goal relative uncertainty is not reached did indeed run out 
of pathlength data, stopping the iterative convergence process in the interest of limiting 
 42 
computational time required.  These relative uncertainties are still low enough to not be a 
major factor in later calculations. 
The results from the code matched well with what would be physically expected: 
lower energy gamma rays have lower escape probabilities and higher-Z materials are more 
difficult to escape from.  Select results are pictured in Figure 8 below: 
 
 
Figure 8 – Escape Probability of Select Elements 
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The discontinuities in Figure 8 reflect the decreased escape probabilities that are due to the 
effect of the K-edge of the materials in the rod. [13]  Since this program considers any 
interaction to be a non-escape event, the escape probabilities are inversely proportional to 
this change.  The higher-Z elements also exhibit such similar structure at lower energies at 
the energies required to free L and M shell electrons.  
3.2.2.2 Build Database 
This subprogram combines several data inputs into a cohesive reaction data 
structure.  These inputs include the basic elemental physical data, possible neutron 
activation reactions and their associated 200 energy bin cross sections, and the energy-
dependent absolute efficiency of the chosen gamma ray detector setup.  It also calculates 
the expected number of counts per decay for a given gamma ray/activation product 
combination.  Since this subprogram consist of mostly data structure and formatting for 
further work, it is not described in detail here. 
3.2.2.3 Build Spectra Information 
This subprogram reads in the raw output files of the MCNP transport calculations 
for each spectrum and pulls it into a useable format for use in further programs.  It also 
extracts the detector locations and separately outputs them for further use.  No calculations 
occur in this subprogram, but it is important because it allows for the rapid integration of 
new transported spectra data in the event of a nuclear explosion or intelligence about a new 
weapons design to be added to the libraries. 
3.2.2.4 Modeling Library and Unknown Activations, Counts and Uncertainties 
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This subprogram combines multiple inputs and calculates the expected number of 
activations for each reaction, at each detector location, for each library spectra (per kt of 
yield).  These activation amounts are then multiplied by a yield to create unknown spectra 
used for the counting portions of the code.  These unknown spectra will later be perturbed 
to introduce additional uncertainty such as one would expect in a physical measurement.  
The subprogram calculates uncertainties for both, using a follow-on calculation of expected 
count rates/total counts to determine the unknown spectra uncertainty.  This program also 
filters out reactions that provide no useful data for the given library of spectra before 
generating its outputs. 
This subprogram uses the reaction data, gamma escape data, spectra data, and 
detector location data previously generated.  In addition, it reads in a list of delay times to 
compute count rate scenarios for intermediate outputs. 
This subprogram assumes that all target rods are elementally pure with an isotopic 
distribution equal to the naturally-occurring ratios on earth.11  It also assumes that all 
uncertainty from the transported spectra is reflected in the relative uncertainties produced 
by MCNP (no major errors in weapon detonation location, detector locations, or gross 
modeling errors.)12  The subprogram also assumes that the uncertainties associated with 
                                                 
 
11 For the elements ultimately considered after preliminary filtering for melting points 
and commercial availability, this assumption is true to at least one part in one hundred 
and does not significantly alter activation results. 
12 In a real-world use of MCNP, the transport for each spectrum would be rerun with the 
latest information about the detonation location, detector locations, terrain, and weather 
data. 
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neutron activation cross sections are small enough to be negligible compared to other 
sources of uncertainty. 
After reading in the appropriate input files from previous subprograms, the code   
then calculates the number of library activations as a function of source spectrum, detector 
location, energy bin, and reaction using Equation (1).  This is done for each spectrum, 
detector location and reaction combination in each energy bin.13  These library reactions 
are scaled to a 1 kt yield.  The subprogram then calculates the number of unknown 
activations (unperturbed) by multiplying the library activations by a chosen yield, with 15 
kt as default.   
Absolute uncertainty in library activations is then computed by the code.  A filter 
then drops any activation records below a cutoff threshold chosen to eliminate data that 
cannot possibly produce sufficient counts to impact the analysis later in the process.  The 
code then sums the number of library and unknown activations over all energy bins for 
each spectrum/location combination, yielding the number of activations for each reaction 
in those circumstances.  The subprogram also calculates diagnostic quantities including 
count rates at different times, the number of counts in a given timeframe, and the maximum 
allowable delay to start counting given set conditions.  The code then appends all these 
                                                 
 
13 Due to memory constraints, this loop actually runs for 3 spectrum/location 
combinations at a time before dumping data to the output files and starting with the next 
3 combinations until complete. 
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data to the activation and diagnostic files and continues until all combinations are 
completed.14  An excerpt of activation data is in Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2 – Excerpt of Activation Data for Fusion Spectrum, Detector Location 16 
  Activations by Energy Bin 









181Hf  Energy 
2.00E+01 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
1.96E+01 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
1.73E+01 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
1.69E+01 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
1.65E+01 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
1.57E+01 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
1.49E+01 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
1.46E+01 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
1.42E+01 5.07E+06 8.35E+09 0.00E+00 1.70E+07 1.41E+07 
1.38E+01 6.51E+06 1.05E+10 0.00E+00 2.16E+07 1.47E+07 
1.35E+01 5.35E+06 8.27E+09 0.00E+00 1.76E+07 8.21E+06 
1.28E+01 2.96E+06 4.41E+09 0.00E+00 9.60E+06 2.63E+06 
1.25E+01 3.50E+06 5.07E+09 0.00E+00 1.13E+07 2.27E+06 
1.22E+01 5.99E+06 8.11E+09 0.00E+00 1.92E+07 3.54E+06 
1.16E+01 4.36E+06 5.32E+09 0.00E+00 1.45E+07 2.29E+06 
1.11E+01 3.37E+06 3.68E+09 0.00E+00 1.16E+07 1.57E+06 
1.05E+01 2.31E+06 2.20E+09 0.00E+00 8.12E+06 9.57E+05 
1.00E+01 2.41E+06 1.87E+09 0.00E+00 8.56E+06 8.78E+05 
 
                                                 
 
14 The activation data files scale proportionally with the number of library spectra 
squared; the raw activation data by spectrum/location/reaction/energy bin exceeds 16 GB 
for a 125-spectrum run.  The run time required scales this way as well. 
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 This excerpt shows a clean upper cutoff energy that reflects the 14.1 MeV neutrons 
released by the fusion process.  Note that different isotopes and reactions within the same 
element have very different activation levels. 
The primary outputs of this subprogram are the library and unknown (perturbed) 
spectra activity and their associated uncertainties.15  The subprogram also outputs 
calculated diagnostic data for a set of fixed conditions to assist with troubleshooting and 
individual test cases.  These diagnostic outputs include the decay rate at different times 
post-activation, the count rates at those time, the total counts in a given time window, and 
the maximum allowed delay that will let sufficient counting statistics be gathered in a 
predetermined time window.  A later subprogram allows a multitude of conditions to be 
tested on individual runs for the scoring and analysis portions of the overall program.  A 
sample of the diagnostic output is in Table 3 below: 
  
                                                 
 
15 The unknown spectra uncertainties will later be recalculated with perturbed spectra and 
by working through the expected number of counts back to the number of original 
activations, to reflect the real-world processing of data and the new uncertainties 
introduced. 
 48 
Table 3 – Select Diagnostic Data for Fusion Spectrum, Detector Location 1616 
  Diagnostic Data 









181Hf   
Count Rate 
at 72 h (1/h) 
4.59E+07 1.16E+05 0.00E+00 1.01E+09 3.73E+03 
Counts, 
delay 72 h, 
3 h count 




1.58E+04 1.28E+02 0.00E+00 5.50E+04 2.00E+03 
 
These diagnostic calculations account for the differing half-life, output gamma rays, and 
associated absolute energy-dependent efficiency of the counting system.  For instance, 
while the tungsten activation rod count rate at 72 hours post activation is barely above the 
1,000 counts/h threshold, the activation product is sufficiently long lived that it maintains 
that approximate count rate for more than 11 days. 
3.2.2.5 Read Card Deck 
A thorough optimization process for the AFIDS target rod set requires testing 
against a multitude of independent parameters and generating dozens of output sets.  To 
avoid changing key variables individually (whether in a text file or in the code itself), a 
card reader subprogram was designed to automate handling a variety of input “cards” (lines 
                                                 
 
16 Note that these calculated quantities are based on summation over all 200 energy bins, 
most of which are not pictured in Error! Reference source not found.. 
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of data in a text file that set the parameters and modification for each scenario to be run) 
and run them in a single operation.  This collection of cards is called the card “deck” (a set 
of scenarios to be run contained in one text file).  Each card in the deck can have multiple 
instructions in any combination.  These instructions take the form of filters and can be set 
to either exclude or include based on the given criteria. 
 The criteria for each card that may be set in the card reader input file includes: 
detector distance from ground zero, azimuth (angle) of detector from ground zero, x/y/z 
position filters, include/exclude threshold/non-threshold reactions, emitted gamma 
energies, commercial available elements, manually select elements to include/exclude, 
manually select detector locations to include/exclude, manually select reactions to 
include/exclude, and the ability to exclude/include all items.  The criteria are executed in 
the order listed within the card, allowing complex filters to be constructed, such as 
excluding all detectors within 500m of ground zero, except in the opposite direction of the 
fallout plume. 
 Each card is assigned a label in the card deck.  This label is used to generate unique 
filenames to organize the different outputs.  Additionally, each card must specify four key 
parameters for the run:  weapon yield (kt), the time to start counting after detonation (h), 
time to count (h), and the minimum number of counts required. 
 The code works by starting with an array reflecting all detector location and 
reaction combinations.  By default, all combinations are enabled.  The code then reads the 
filters and applies them using Boolean logic in sequence.  When a card is complete, the 
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use/do not use array alongside the card’s key parameters are saved as a binary input file for 
the subsequent subprograms. 
3.2.2.6 Determine Best Gamma Rays / Avoid Interferences 
The next subprogram performs two functions.  The first function is to check all the 
gamma rays that each reactant element can produce via all its activation products against 
the others for interference.  This interference can be caused two ways: two different 
reactant isotope reactions leading to the same activation product, or two different reactant 
element reactions having energy peaks too close together with similar magnitude in the 
number of expected counts, making them unresolvable.  The former interference is 
problematic because each reaction has a different energy-dependent cross section, and if 
two reactions (starting from the same element) lead to the same activation product, there is 
no way to determine which cross sections produced what portion of the counts.17  The latter 
is problematic because the counting system cannot differentiate total counts between two 
gamma lines too close together. 
The second function of this code is to determine the best gamma rays to consider 
for each reaction, and then from the best gamma rays for each reaction, the best gamma 
ray to count for each candidate target rod element.  This is a multistep process, as the latter 
task depends on the library spectra as well as the cross sections of each reaction.  Gamma 
                                                 
 
17 Some of these interferences could be avoided by using isotopically-pure target rods, 
but that is prohibitively expensive for most circumstances expected in the AFIDS 
program. 
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rays previously flagged as having any interference are excluded from this selection process.  
The selection of the overall best gamma ray for each candidate target rod element is 
determined by which gamma ray has the highest number of counts resulting from the 
fluence of the greatest number of the library spectra.  Whichever gamma “wins” for the 
most spectra is selected. 
Selecting to only count the best gamma ray from each element18 simplifies the 
counting process for the end user without losing fidelity in the model.  Each activation 
product has well-established branching ratios that state the probability of each possible 
gamma ray being emitted per activated isotope decay.  The best gamma ray for an 
activation product is not solely the one with the highest branching ratio, but the gamma ray 
that results in the most counts (without interference).  This requires consideration of both 
the probability of the gamma ray escaping the target rod (see section 3.2.2.1) and the 
energy-dependent efficiency of the detector. 
The code starts by reading in previously generated reaction, spectra, gamma ray 
and activation data, alongside the input card deck.19  Using the key parameters from the 
card deck, for each spectrum/detector location combination, it calculates the number of 
                                                 
 
18 The decision to use a single best reaction / gamma ray for each element, instead of say, 
the best gamma ray for each different activation product isotope, was designed to both 
simplify counting, and avoid undesirable biasing in the chi-squared scoring metric that 
would result from an element with numerous countable activation products being counted 
multiple times and receiving a heavier weight in the scoring.  Counting two separate 
reactions with different activation products is possible and would have been a reasonable 
decision as well. 
19 The entire code is run separately for each card in the deck, with separate outputs. 
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counts of each activation product at the times specified in the input deck using equations 
derived from equation (3).  Then, for each reactant element (as opposed to isotope), it 
checks all the possible reactions for common products (first type of interference) and for 
counting peaks too close together and too similar in magnitude (second type of 
interference).  If either interference condition is met, all offending gamma rays are flagged 
and not used further. 
For the remaining gamma rays, the code then determines which gamma ray from a 
given reaction path ultimately produces the greatest number of counts per decay, after 
accounting for escape probability and detector efficiency.  Then, within a reactant element, 
the best gamma ray for that spectrum/location combination is determined.20  This process 
is repeated for all the spectra in the library at all the locations. Then the code predicts the 
counting results to determine the most frequently selected gamma ray energy for a given 
element across the entire library of spectra and locations.  This becomes the best gamma 
ray for that element and will be used for that card in the matching subprogram and further 
analysis. 
3.3 Match Scoring and Analysis Process 
3.3.1 Match Chi-Squared Contribution Equation 
                                                 
 
20 It is possible to use more than one reaction pathway; a judgement was made in favor of 
simplifying the counting and scoring processes by not doing this.  Future work can revisit 
this possibility. 
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2 ≡ Chi-squared value, used to determine how good of a statistical fit two different 
spectra are.  This quantity depends on 4 independent variables (library spectra activations, 
unknown spectra activations, detector location, and reaction) plus a scaling factor (yield) 
which is used to minimize the overall chi-squared value. [Calculated quantity] 
F ≡ Degrees of freedom – determined by the number of valid detector 
location/reaction combinations for the two spectra being compared.  For the sample 
calculation, a single degree of freedom is tested.  Will be referred to as “countable 
locations” when discussing the AFIDS system.  The degrees of freedom are bounded by 
the upper limit of F ≤ DJ. 
d ≡ Detector location index 
D ≡ Number of detector locations 
j ≡ Reaction index 
J ≡ Number of reactions considered 
ys ≡ yield (in kt); used as a scaling factor to minimize the magnitude of the overall 
chi-squared for library source s 
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Bsdj ± usdj ≡ The library reference spectrum’s activation level and uncertainty at a 
given detector location for a given reaction.  These library spectra are produced assuming 
a 1.0 kt yield, allowing ys to serve as a scaling factor to match the unknown spectrum’s 
activations. 
Mdj ± σdj ≡ The unknown spectrum’s activation level and uncertainty at a given 
detector location for a given reaction. 
3.3.2 Match Scoring and Analysis Procedure 
This section describes the portion of the code used to determine match scoring and 
then the approach used to analyze the results.  The matching subprogram is the final 
subprogram, shown near the bottom of Figure 7. 
3.3.2.1 Matching Score Code 
The matching score subprogram calculates best fit scores for each combination of 
unknown and library weapon spectra, and an associated best fit weapon yield for each 
score.  In a real-world AFIDS matching test, a single unknown activation set would be 
tested against the entire library of possible starting spectra (and their associated activation 
sets).  For purposes of analyzing match chi-squared scores of different detector material 
configurations, a full set of unknown spectra are generated by perturbing the library spectra 
to simulate measurement uncertainty, which are then cross-compared.  This leads to a 
matrix comparing each spectrum against the whole library set, with the best matches 
occurring along the diagonal representing perturbed spectra being tested against their 
original form.  Along this diagonal the calculated yields also track closely with a 
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predetermined yield used to generate the unknown spectra.  By default, this predetermined 
yield is 15 kt. 
This subprogram uses the compiled reaction data, detector location data, activation 
data, and interference data previously generated.  It is driven by the input deck cards 
previously processed, as it runs each card’s scenarios independently and generates output 
separately. 
This subprogram inherits the assumptions from the previous subprograms, with the 
assumption that the transported library spectra only have the statistical uncertainties 
generated from the MCNP transport calculation.  It assumes that the modelled city and 
terrain is sufficiently detailed and that the weapon detonation location is sufficiently certain 
to not add to the uncertainty. 
The subprogram does not consider detector orientation relative to direction of the 
nuclear detonation.  This original assumption is tested in section 4.1.1.2, and may require 
a correction factor for real-world use.  For purposes of analysis, it is assumed that 
directional dependence will be accounted for and corrected when calculating activation 
levels. 
The code starts by reading in all needed previous outputs, including the card deck 
that specifies the scenarios to run in the subprogram.  The code then filters out any 
element/detector location combinations excluded by a scenario’s input card.  The 
subprogram then calculates the expected number of counts for each possible element 
(subject to filters from the input deck) that would be detected for each library spectra 
(scaled up to the unknown weapon’s yield), incorporating the decay time until the start of 
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counting, allowed counting time, and minimum number of counts needed to reduce 
statistical uncertainty.  The default parameters are a 15 kt yield, a 72 hour delay in the start 
of counting, a 3 hour allowed count, and 3000 total counts required. 
The subprogram then filters out any element/detector location/library spectrum 
combinations that do not generate the minimum number of counts required.  These 
combinations will not be considered for further analysis for this scenario.  This is to prevent 
any activation level with too great of uncertainty to be used from influencing the match 
chi-squared calculations. 
The code then creates the unknown spectra set by perturbing the library spectra set 
using a normal distribution and the reported uncertainties from the MCNP transport 
calculation.  This perturbation is based on a single standard deviation by default; it can be 
scaled up for other tests if desired.  The resulting unknown spectra are scaled up by the 
yield factor from the input deck. 
The subprogram then calculates a match chi-squared score and associated yield for 
each unknown and library spectra combination.  A golden section search is used to find the 
yield factor that minimizes the chi-squared score calculated from equation (5).  During the 
process, useful summations of the match chi-squared contribution by element and detector 
location are compiled as well.  Upon completion, each scenario’s independent results are 
written to files before starting the next. 
A sample of the primary output of the matching program generated using all default 
values is below in Table 4: 
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Table 4 – Matching Results: χ2 and Yield Results, Default Scenario 
    χ2 value 
  Unknown Weapon 






FM 0.22 4105 1649 225 224 
FUS 1181 0.16 4927 1862 1575 
LB 730 4077 0.09 1454 1439 
WPu 184 4143 2649 0.13 4.14 
WU 171 4305 2531 4.14 0.10 
 
      
       
    Yield 






FM 15.0 kt 53.7 Mt 328.0 kt 5.0 Mt 3.2 Mt 
FUS 0.01 t 15.0 kt 0.36 t 2.7 kt 1.8 kt 
LB 0.99 t 59.1 Mt 15.0 kt 627.8 kt 384.6 kt 
WPu 0.05 t 150.1 kt 1.3 kt 15.0 kt 9.8 kt 
WU 0.07 t 231.0 kt 2.0 kt 23.1 kt 15.0 kt 
 
Note the low matching scores along the diagonal that represent the unknown and library 
spectra matches, and how that diagonal’s yield scores are very close to the default unknown 
yield of 15 kt.  The Little Boy (LB) library spectrum was such a poor match for the Fusion 
(FUS) unknown spectrum that the code’s upper yield scaling limit was reached – 10,000 
times the expected value, in this case 150 Mt for a 15 kt unknown spectrum.  The large 
yield factors for the FUS column show the program trying to match library spectra that 
lack the characteristic fusion 14.1 MeV neutron peak to a spectrum that originated with 
that large peak.  The match chi-squared scores are very high, but a yield estimate that is 
wildly out of bounds compared to real world estimates is another indicator of a poor spectra 
match. 
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 Another important set of outputs are the breakdowns of match chi-squared 
contributions.  These are broken down for each scenario by detector location and element 
(and thus reaction).  Two separate scenarios’ differing results (summed over each of the 25 
library/unknown spectra combinations for each element) are shown as examples below in 
Table 5 and Table 6: 
 
Table 5 – Match Chi-Squared Contribution, Default Scenario 
χ2 contribution 
Mg  1.41%   Rh  0.27% 
Al  1.45%   Pd  0.52% 
Ti  2.80%   Cd  1.61% 
Cr  8.56%   Sn  0.26% 
Fe  0.26%   Hf  7.39% 
Co  4.40%   Ta  8.07% 
Ni  5.78%   W   5.00% 
Cu  11.13%   Re  9.64% 
Ge  0.42%   Ir  16.28% 
Zr  0.42%   Au  10.30% 
Mo  2.36%   Pb  1.65% 
Table 6 – Match Chi-Squared Contribution, Default Scenario plus 500 keV 
Threshold 
χ2 contribution 
Mg  0.53%   Cu  0.28% 
Al  0.39%   Mo  0.27% 
Ti  22.20%   Rh  1.16% 
Cr  0.01%   Cd  0.26% 
Fe  0.97%   Re  4.12% 
Co  0.35%   Au  11.10% 
Ni  58.11%   Pb  0.24% 
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Note that changing a single parameter in the analysis significantly changed the relative 
importance of each element to the match chi-squared scores, and eliminated several 
elements altogether. 
 Another useful set of metrics reported by the subprogram are the countable 
locations for each scenario.  The countable locations represent the number of 
element/detector location combinations for each spectrum that meet the minimum counting 
criteria.  Sample output from the default scenario is below in Table 7: 
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Table 7 – Countable Locations, Default Scenario 
  Countable Locations 
  FM FUS LB WPu WU 
Mg  0 4 0 0 0 
Al  0 4 0 0 0 
Ti  0 11 0 2 0 
Cr  0 18 3 10 8 
Fe  0 2 0 0 0 
Co  1 24 6 16 14 
Ni  0 13 0 3 2 
Cu  3 30 7 20 18 
Ge  0 12 1 6 5 
Zr  0 17 2 7 6 
Mo  1 26 6 16 15 
Rh  0 4 0 0 0 
Pd  0 10 1 6 5 
Cd  3 30 8 20 18 
Sn  0 9 1 5 3 
Hf  6 31 10 22 21 
Ta  15 32 21 31 30 
W   15 32 21 31 30 
Re  19 32 24 32 32 
Ir  17 32 21 32 31 
Au  27 32 30 32 32 
Pb  0 4 0 0 0 
Total: 107 409 162 291 270 
 
Since the default scenario includes 34 detector locations, this is the maximum number of 
countable locations a library/unknown spectra combination can have for a given element.  
Gold has a large number of countable locations across all the combinations, whereas lead 
is only countable in a handful of locations for a single library spectrum – FUS.  Using these 
data alongside the match chi-squared contribution chart in selecting elements that not only 
have large match chi-squared contributions in general, but that cover a large portion of the 
spectra search space and work at a variety of detector locations.  If an element only works 
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at detector locations very close to the nuclear explosion, it may be difficult, slow, or even 
impossible to recover those detectors, reducing that element’s utility for the AFIDS project.  
Multiple scenarios will be designed to test the sensitivity of each elements’ countable 
locations to both distance and direction from the explosion. 
3.4 Analysis Procedure 
This section lays out the overall plan for selecting optimal materials for the AFIDS 
detector.  Some of the analysis plan changed during the research due to the nature of the 
initial results, especially the concentration of match chi-squared contribution in a limited 
number of elements. 
3.4.1 Initial Approach and Changes 
The initial approach to this analysis was to create a scoring algorithm to rate 
different combinations of elements for the AFIDS detector material against each other, then 
use a computer program to exhaustively examine the search space to determine the highest 
scoring combination for a set optimization criterion.  This approach had several 
shortcomings. 
First, with 27 commercially-available elements with high enough melting points to 
be useful for AFIDS, alongside the 20 target rod slots available in the design, the search 
space was very large indeed – 2720, approximately 4(1028) possible combinations.21  
                                                 
 
21 Re-use of the same element multiple times in a detector has value and will be 
considered.  Multiple copies can increase the available mass, increasing the number of 
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Scoring each combination takes about 5 seconds of real time with the available computer 
power, which led to a wildly impractical runtime to complete the search.  A directed 
optimization approach would be required. 
Second, the relative match chi-squared contributions from different candidate 
elements was not evenly or randomly distributed.  Rather it was concentrated into 4-7 
elements for most scenarios, including the default scenario, with less than 1% of the 
remaining contribution attributable to the other ~20 elements.  These two initial realizations 
drove a change from an exhaustive search approach for optimization to a manual 
optimization driven by prioritized criteria, subject to constraints of cost and the amount of 
time a sample remained countable. 
3.4.2 Account for Cost of Target Rod Materials 
 The AFIDS project is subject to cost constraints, and even within the hard 
constraint, improving the effectiveness/cost ratio is desirable.  The budget for each 
detector, when manufacturing at scale, is $250 for each complete detector set, including up 
to 20 target rods.  The materials and manufacture for the detector body accounts for $50 of 
this, leaving a maximum of $200 for target rod elements.  In Table 8 below, the 
approximate costs for a target rod of each of the commercially-available elements are 
shown, with dimensions of 1.0 mm diameter x 5.0 cm length, with the assumption of a 
                                                 
 
activations and eventually counts.  Multiple copies can be dispersed angularly to mitigate 
directional attenuation effects as well. 
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minimum 1,000 rod purchase.  If AFIDS is fully fielded, this cost will only be lower at 
scale. 
 
Table 8 – Cost per Target Rod, 1mm Diameter, Minimum 1,000 Rod Purchase22 
Cost per rod, min. 1,000 rods  Cost per rod, min. 1,000 rods 
Symbol Element Cost  Symbol Element Cost 
Mg  Magnesium $18.94  Pd  Palladium $196.50 
Al  Aluminum $0.06  Ag  Silver $1.06 
Si  Silicon $169.00  Cd  Cadmium $13.40 
Ti  Titanium $0.23  In  Indium $2.37 
Cr  Chromium $0.85  Sn  Tin $0.13 
Fe  Iron $0.10  Hf  Hafnium $10.50 
Co  Cobalt $42.10  Ta  Tantalum $4.13 
Ni  Nickel $0.35  W   Tungsten $0.59 
Cu  Copper $0.06  Re  Rhenium $123.20 
Ge  Germanium $10.95  Ir  Iridium $390.24 
Zr  Zirconium $1.88  Au  Gold $97.80 
Nb  Niobium $0.89  Pb  Lead $0.08 
Mo  Molybdenum $0.30  Bi  Bismuth $0.33 
Rh  Rhodium $208.17     
 
Note that two elements, rhodium and iridium, outright exceed the total target rod budget 
for a single rod.  However, it is possible to place half-length rods into the AFIDS detector, 
which would cut these costs in half and make those elements still feasible to use.  They 
                                                 
 
22 These costs are based on comparing scientific supplier catalogs offering elemental 
metals at >99% purity in 1mm diameter rod form for a 5 cm length.  A larger scale 
AFIDS purchase by the US government could drive better economy of scale and pricing. 
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would need to provide very strong impact on the results for inclusion, however.  Several 
of the more common metals are very inexpensive, creating a very low threshold for their 
inclusion if they provide useful results at all. 
3.4.3 Maximize Discrimination of Incorrect Spectra 
 Early in the analysis of results, it was clear that the AFIDS match scoring approach 
would clearly delineate correct matches under the ideal conditions of the default scenario, 
which includes recovering all 34 detectors and counting all the target rods in each – an 
unlikely scenario in the real world, but a useful one for comparing element performances.  
There were no elements that produced false negatives – high match chi-squared scores for 
correct matches. 
 The more useful metric was how high of a match chi-squared contribution the 
elements each made to incorrect matches.  An element that scored very low (<1) for the 
correct match and very high (>1,000) for most of the incorrect matches is much more useful 
than an element that scores low for almost every combination.  The discriminatory value 
comes in how strongly an element rejects an incorrect match. 
3.4.4 Account for coverage across spectra types 
 While the magnitude of discrimination discussed in the previous section is a driving 
factor in the selection of elements, a breadth of coverage is needed as well.  An example is 
nickel.  This element does an excellent job of discriminating between fission and fusion 
spectra at a very low cost.  However, it is less useful in discriminating between some fission 
spectra, and it is unable to get sufficient counts at most detector locations for the LB 
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spectrum.  While a very useful material, it must be complemented by an element like 
copper that better discriminates the different fission spectra and is countable in more 
locations for the LB spectrum. 
3.4.5 Minor Criteria 
 There are several other small matters to consider when selecting the optimized 
target set.  These are not as important as maximizing discrimination ability and ensuring 
wide coverage across spectra but should be accomplished if possible. 
 The inclusion of elements that feature neutron energy threshold activation reactions 
can reduce uncertainty related to local neutron scattering effects.  An extreme example 
would be a detector placed near a swimming pool, full of highly-moderating hydrogen.  A 
city-scale MCNP model could not capture such local details that could affect activation 
results.  While the detectors would be placed more sensibly than that, threshold reactions 
are likely to have undergone fewer scattering events on the way to the detector, and the 
scatters they do make are more likely to be in the form of skyshine, which is less affected 
by the details of the urban terrain below.  This creates a better signal/noise ratio. 
 It is desirable to have at least one element whose main activation product has a long 
half-life to allow follow-up counting and validation well after the 3-10 days immediately 
following the event.  Researchers are still studying activated samples from Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki as new and better analysis techniques and equipment are invented.  Intentionally 
including one long-lived activation product could aid in additional studies after the 
immediate aftermath. 
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 A tertiary consideration is avoiding vandalism and theft of the detectors from those 
who would sell the metals inside for scrap.  An AFIDS deployment would place dozens if 
not hundreds of detectors in a large city, and if it became known that each detector 
contained a significant amount of gold that could be resold, they could be targeted.  While 
many of these detectors will be out of easy reach, it is not practical to check on them 
frequently, and the detectors could be missing materials without anyone being made aware.  
Therefore, highly-pilferable materials like gold should be avoided unless they provide very 
large contributions to the project.  Elements like iridium, although expensive, are less easily 
identified and do not have a robust resell market. 
3.5 Selection Methodology 
 The goal of the optimization is to select the target rods that clearly discriminate 
between the most spectra, with maximal spectra coverage, at a minimum cost. 
3.5.1 Spectra Set 
 The optimization will consider all five unclassified spectra equally weighted.  The 
ability to discriminate between fission and fusion, gun-type and implosion, and uranium 
versus plutonium, are all valuable parts of the AFIDS project.  The breadth of coverage is 
important; certain elements excel at distinguishing between fission and fusion spectra, 
while others discriminate well between different fission spectra.  Two examples are shown 
in Table 9 below: 
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Table 9 – Match Chi-Squared Contributions, Select Spectra, Default Scenario 
  χ2 contribution 
Library WPu WPu 
Unknown FUS WU 
Mg  7.16% 0.00% 
Al  7.33% 0.00% 
Ti  14.01% 0.00% 
Cr  7.48% 4.20% 
Fe  0.57% 0.00% 
Co  2.73% 2.30% 
Ni  24.16% 5.12% 
Cu  5.92% 8.82% 
Ge  0.52% 0.54% 
Zr  0.39% 1.86% 
Mo  2.48% 3.12% 
Rh  1.37% 0.00% 
Pd  0.72% 1.62% 
Cd  0.91% 2.77% 
Sn  0.49% 0.03% 
Hf  2.53% 8.25% 
Ta  2.61% 13.67% 
W   1.42% 7.37% 
Re  2.68% 8.94% 
Ir  4.14% 16.18% 
Au  2.10% 15.23% 
Pb  8.30% 0.00% 
χ2 total 4143 4.15 
 
In the first column, which shows the discrimination between a fission (WPu) and fusion 
(FUS) spectrum, elements like chromium and copper stand out, performing better than 
even the expensive iridium and gold target rods.  Conversely, the second column shows 
contributions to two similar fission spectra undergoing discrimination.  Iridium and gold, 
alongside tantalum, provide much of the chi-squared score.  Copper does less but is still a 
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valuable contributor, especially for its price.  Chromium is much less effective.  Note that 
some elements like nickel perform equally well between these two different tests.  Finding 
a combination of target rods that can cover the range of possible spectra is critical for 
reliable discrimination. 
3.5.2 Yield Range 
 The minimum yield that will be examined is 15 kt, which is in line with a gun-type 
device of limited size and sophistication.  This is lower end of the yield range is also the 
most important, because it is the hardest to obtain sufficient counts for.  Some tests, focused 
on threshold reactions, will conducted at 150 kt, to increase the number of countable 
locations. 
3.5.3 Minimum Distance (Melting Considerations) 
 The temperatures endured by a detector are primarily a function of nuclear weapon 
yield and distance.  Previous work on AFIDS conducted a detailed analysis of what 
distances each material is likely to remain unmelted as a function of yield. [2]  Most 
potential target rod materials have melting points exceeding the aluminum detector body, 
and the detector body itself somewhat protects target rods from the heat of the explosion.  
A notable exception is tin, which melts at distances further out than the aluminum detector 
body. 
 Based on the previous work, a minimum distance of 400m from the explosion will 
be required for the 15 kt explosions, 700m for the 150 kt, and 1 km for the 1.5 Mt.  
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Detectors inside these radii may be partially melted and uncountable and should not be 
relied on for match discrimination. 
3.5.4 Angular Effects 
 Angular effects come in two forms: the change in neutron fluence dependent on the 
location of a target rod within the detector relative to the direction of the blast, and the 
ability to retrieve and count detectors in a timely manner disrupted due to directional 
fallout.  The effects of the target rod location are discussed in more detail at the start of 
section 4.1; selecting elements with reaction thresholds >500 keV avoids the majority of 
these effects.  However, non-threshold reactions are still usable with modeling and 
correction factors applied. 
 The fallout plume from a nuclear detonation will be created downwind of the 
explosion.  Winds are generally unpredictable, so a detector target rod set must not depend 
strongly on detectors located in a particular direction for its results.  To test for this, analysis 
will exclude 60-degree swathes of detectors in multiple directions to see if results are 
significantly affected. 
3.5.5 Delay Time Before Start of Counting 
 Elements whose activation products have longer half-lives will maintain a 
sufficiently high count rate for a longer period.  This allows for a greater delay in the 
collection and counting of these elements.  While some shorter half-life elements can be 
accommodated by strategically planning the order of counting, generally speaking, 
elements who can maintain the minimum count rate for longer are more valuable.  It is 
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difficult to predict how long the delay in the start of counting may be, especially in the 
more damaged or radioactive areas that detectors are in. 
 The trade-off of a longer half-life is that these activation products will tend to have 
lower count rates in general, even if that count rate is maintained for a longer time.  Some 
of these elements will require a large number of initial activations to create a count rate 




CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
4.1 Validation of Assumptions 
 The four major assumptions listed in section 3.1.1 are examined in this chapter, 
using both experimental and modeling approaches.  Refinements to the approach based on 
these tests will be incorporated before conducting the optimization of target rods. 
4.1.1.1 Gamma Self-shielding Assumption 
 An initial assumption was made that the gamma rays emitted from activation 
products would not be significantly self-shielded by the target rods themselves.  To test 
this assumption, the Gamma Escape Probability code (section 3.2.2.1) was written to model 
uniformly distributed, isotropically-directed gamma rays emitted at a range of energies 
from each of the elements.  Select results shown in Figure 8 (page 42) illustrate that this is 
not a valid assumption.  Low energy gamma rays are significantly attenuated while 
escaping the 1mm diameter rods, and even higher energy gamma rays have measurable 
attenuation. 
 Fortunately, this attenuation is only a function of the element and the gamma ray’s 
energy, so lookup tables were calculated for each element over a large range of gamma 
energies, with close attention paid to energy levels near discontinuities in attenuation.  
These lookup tables were then used in the remainder of the code as a correction factor when 
determining the number of initial activations based on counts taken at a later time. 
4.1.1.2 Detector Body Shielding and Angular Effects Assumptions 
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Note that this section assumes the worst case of a monodirectional incoming 
neutron fluence to determine the differences in angular positioning of target rods.  Actual 
fluence will have scattering effects that reduce the effects of angular positioning.  The 
validations of these assumptions are combined because they are both testable using a 
detailed MCNP model of the main part of the detector body and the transported neutron 
spectra.  They are also testable by physical experiment.   
4.1.1.2.1 Modeling Approach 
The modeling efforts will show that there are significant effects from the detector 
body, especially at select energy levels.  There are also significant effects dependent on the 
target rod slot location relative to the direction of incoming radiation.  A representation of 




Figure 9 – MCNP Model of Detector and Target Rods 
 The first modeling approached used an MCNP model of the aluminum detector 
body, constructed out of Al-6061 alloy.  Only the cylindrical portion, which is the hollow 
piece separate from the top and bottom of the detector body, is modelled to focus on the 
angular effects.  Target rods are also modelled.  Changing which element to use for the 
target rods did not appreciably change the fluences in other target rod slots, so aluminum 
was used by default.  The source term was designed to isolate the effects of scattering and 
capturing in the aluminum body by incoming neutron energy level.  This was accomplished 
by a series of 200 files, each with a monoenergetic source aligning with the 200 energy 
groups of the reaction cross section data.  Figure 10 and Figure 11 display the normalized 
flux versus energy group for each target rod location, with 0 degrees representing the target 
rod directly facing the incoming neutrons, and 180 degrees on the very far side of the 





































Figure 11 – Normalized Flux vs. Energy (MeV), Zoomed View 
 
 There are select energy bins, including multiple bins in the 30 keV-90 keV range, 
with very large reductions in flux.  The maximum effect is in the 108 degree slot, which 
requires the incoming fluence to travel through the largest amount of material before 
reaching it.  The largest reduction was 78% in a single energy bin.  Some positions have 
normalized fluxes greater than 1, though this effect is not nearly as significant. 
 These large reductions in flux align closely with the resonances in the aluminum 
cross section data.  In Figure 12, the Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF) cross section 
































Figure 12 – Normalized Flux vs. Energy (MeV) with 27-Al Normalized Cross Section 
 Since the angular effects appear important, they were tested again, this time using 
realistic transported neutron spectra from the spectra list.  The effects were not as 
pronounced since the majority of the incoming fluence was not contained in the 
absorption/scattering peaks, but the 108 degree slot did show a 15% reduction in flux in an 
average test case. 
 The effect of the detector body and angular slot position, while not overwhelming, 
is measurable and noteworthy.  In this worst-case scenario of a mono-directional beam 
source the effects are not negligible; they must be accounted for and corrected in physical 
measurements.  The real world fluence would not be mono-directional in nature, but the 
































work.  The needed correction factors can be pre-calculated using a representative unknown 
spectrum.  The effect can also be reduced if multiple copies of the same element are 
dispersed along the angles of the detector body and averaged. 
 Although this assumption is not valid for real-world use of AFIDS, the effects are 
not so large that they will change the number of countable locations (countable elements) 
in the majority of detector locations.  In the subsequent modeling, it is assumed that the 
correct factor has been used to adjust for angular position as part of the counting / activation 
determination process. 
4.1.1.2.2 Effects of Impurities in Alloy 
 To determine if impurities in Al-6061 were causing significant effects on the flux 
received by the target rods, the MCNP models were re-run using pure aluminum.  The 
results were almost identical, with the same angular effects.  Therefore there is nothing to 
gain by using the more expensive but higher purity Al-1100 alloy. 
4.1.1.2.3 Experimental Approach 
 A limited series of physical experiments were conducted to validate the modeling 
discussed in the previous section.  An americium-beryllium (AmBe) source as well as a 
deuterium-deuterium neutron generator (2.5 MeV neutron peak) were used as neutron 
sources.  Detector prototypes constructed of Al-6061 were used to hold target rods.  To 
match the model, only the cylindrical portion of the detectors (no top or bottom pieces) 
were emplaced. 
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 For the AmBe source, calculations determined that nickel and titanium target rods 
were most likely to produce enough counts for reasonable uncertainties, given the 
constraints on experimental and counting time.  Unfortunately, liquid nitrogen supply 
issues interrupted the counting of these samples, leaving decayed activities too small to be 
useful. 
 For the neutron generator, copper was the target rod with the greatest predicted 
activation level.23  Two targets were irradiated simultaneously as pictured in Figure 13 
below: 
                                                 
 
23 Gold target rods would have performed better, but were not available due to cost. 
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Figure 13 – Neutron Generator Experimental Setup 
 
The “outer” position is the rightmost detector, with the copper target rod in the position 
180 degrees from the front of the detector facing the neutron generator.  The “inner” 
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position is on the left and has its target rod in the 0-degree position, with the minimal 
amount of aluminum holder material between the source and the target rod.  Red arrows 
point at the slots used.  Note that the target rods are equidistant from the source; only the 
amount of detector body in the line-of-sight to the source has been altered.  The irradiation 
was performed simultaneously to minimize effects of the neutron generator’s warm-up 
cycle in producing a consistent neutron fluence over time. 
 The expected activation reaction was 63Cu(n,γ)64Cu, given that the neutron source 
was below the energy threshold for the competing 63Cu(n,2n)62Cu and 65Cu(n,2n)64Cu 
reactions.  This reaction’s activation product has a gamma line at 511 keV due to the 
immediate annihilation of the emitted positron, which occurs in 61% of the decay events. 
 The samples were both irradiated for 3 hours.  The outer target was counted 
immediately after irradiation for 2 hours; the inner target was counted immediately after 
the outer target at 2.5 hours after irradiation, in order to increase the counts captured after 
the second target’s 64Cu (half-life of 12.7 hours) decayed while waiting for the detector.  
The HPGe counts are shown in Figure 14 below: 
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Figure 14 – 511 keV Peaks from Cu Counting 
 
The sharp annihilation peak matches the expected reaction. Integrating the peaks for the 
two rods yields 1960 ± 50 counts for the outer position and 2310 ± 50 counts for the inner 
position.  Correcting for decay and calculating the initial number of activations, the ratio 
of activations between outer and inner rod locations was is 0.94 ± 0.03, which is a function 
of the intervening aluminum thickness. 
 An MCNP simulation of the experiment assumed a monoenergetic, 
monodirectional source of 2.5 MeV neutrons arriving at the detector body.  This 
approximation is sufficient to determine the proportionality between the outer and inner 
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target rod positions.  The reaction rates are calculated for both the 0 and 180-degree cells 
using modified track length estimator tally.  The ratio of the total reaction rates from the 
simulation was 0.9677 ± 0.0003 between outer and inner, a lower ratio than the 
experimental value, but within the combined margin of error.  Given the simplification of 
the models that ignored the angular and energy spread of the neutron generator’s fluence, 
this experimental result matches reasonably well with the models used in MCNP, giving 
confidence to that modeling effort. 
4.1.1.2.4 Correction of Detector Shielding/Angular Dependence Assumption 
 Based on the experimental validation of the MCNP modeling, it is clear that there 
are a measurable, significant effects from both the detector body interacting with the 
incoming fluence, and that the effect is strongly dependent on the position of the target rod 
relative to the direction of the incoming radiation.  The localized energy effects can be as 
high as 80% in a very few cases, but in practical application, the worst position (108 
degrees) will receive about 20% less activations than the optimal position (0 degrees).  This 
20% factor assumes that the incoming radiation is monodirectional, which is not strictly 
true, so the real-world correction factor would be less. 
 To correctly account for this in real-world modeling, the MCNP transport of the 
library spectra to the detector locations must also tally information about the direction of 
the incoming neutrons, to determine how much the direction is biased.  Then an additional 
smaller model MCNP code simulation could take that angularly-distributed incoming 
fluence and transport it the final distance through the detector body to the target rods to 
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model the relative differences in activation levels to be expected based on position.  This 
is beyond the scope of this research effort but not difficult to account for. 
 For purposes of selecting the optimal target rod set, this correction factor would be 
applied to the modelled activations, propagated through the simulated counting process, 
then divided back out when determining the initial activation levels.  The only effect it 
would have is whether a particular target rod would meet the 3,000-count threshold needed 
for good statistics.  The desire is to err on the side of including candidate materials versus 
excluding them, and a 20% reduction in count rate would not affect the selection of many 
of the material, so this factor is ignored in the simulations in this research. 
4.2 Effects of Detector and Foil Selection on Match Discrimination 
 In this section, multiple parameters will be varied to make new scenarios to test the 
ability of each elemental target rod to provide match chi-squared contributions and 
countable locations under a variety of conditions and restrictions.  The overarching goal of 
the optimization remains to create the best discrimination between spectra, at the lowest 
cost, with enough robustness to handle a wide span of the possible design and target space 
of the unknown weapon. 
4.2.1 Distance 
 The distance between the nuclear explosion and a given detector affects multiple 
aspects of the AFIDS system.  First, detectors too close to the detector for a given yield 
may partially melt, leading to unusable samples.  Second, detectors close to the explosion 
will be generally more difficult to recover, as their supporting structures such as buildings 
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may have been destroyed, the areas may have suffered high levels of radiation and 
secondary fires, and other emergency response priorities may preclude access.  Third, the 
further a detector is from the explosion, the fewer activations it will receive in general.  
Detectors too far from the source will have fewer and fewer target rods sufficiently 
activated for counting.  Conversely, these detectors are in safer areas to retrieve, so their 
counting would likely begin sooner, partially mitigating the loss of signal due decreasing 
activity with distance since the target rods will have less time to decay before counting.   
 In a large grid array, there will be a large number of detectors outside each 
minimum distance, which eventually will overwhelm the ability to count all the target rods 
from those locations in a timely manner.  Since the activation levels and discrimination 
value falls off at larger distances, there are diminishing returns from counting detectors 
further and further away.  The effects of setting a maximum distance has been tested as 
well.  The 34 detectors modeling the default scenario have distances from the explosion 
ranging from 173 m up to 1,962 m.   
4.2.1.1 Minimum Distance or Greater 
 Starting with the default scenario parameters, 14 scenarios were generated with 
minimum distances of 300 – 1500 m, alongside a no-minimum distance scenario for 
comparison.  The match chi-squared contributions of the commercially-available elements 
are listed in Table 10 below: 
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Table 10 – Match Chi-Squared Contribution vs. Minimum Distance Required (km) 
 
 
The “X” denotes that an element’s target rod cannot reach the minimum number of counts 
(default of 3,000) at that distance (given the default delay time and counting time of 72 
hours and 3 hours, respectively.) 
 Starting at the no minimum distance scenario, the initial concentration of the match 
chi-squared contributions is apparent.  Of the 23 elements with useful data, only 12 of the 
elements contribute 2% or more to the match chi-squared totals.  There is a particular 
concentration near the higher-Z elements of hafnium through gold.  None of the major 
0 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Mg 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5 0.6 0.9 X X X X X X X X
Al 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5 0.7 0.9 X X X X X X X X
Ti 2.5 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.2 2.4 1.7 1.2 0.5 0.7 X X X X
Cr 10.8 10.2 8.6 6.3 4.9 3.8 2.9 2.3 1.6 1.2 0.4 X X X
Fe 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.0 X X X X X X X X X X
Co 5.2 5.4 4.4 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.4 1.6 0.8 0.6 0.4 X
Ni 4.3 4.0 6.0 6.1 4.0 4.1 3.7 3.0 1.5 1.3 X X X X
Cu 10.6 13.7 11.0 9.2 6.8 6.6 6.2 5.6 6.2 6.0 5.5 2.2 1.6 2.4
Ge 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 X X X X
Zr 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 X X X
Mo 3.1 3.0 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4
Rh 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 X X X X X X X X
Pd 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 X X X X X X
Cd 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.7 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.5 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.1 0.5 0.5
In 0.1 0.1 X X X X X X X X X X X X
Sn 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 X X X X X X
Hf 6.8 6.8 7.4 4.9 4.7 4.3 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.1 3.2 2.3 1.7 1.6
Ta 8.7 8.2 8.0 9.6 10.8 10.7 10.4 10.6 11.1 10.1 8.1 11.2 8.9 7.0
W  4.9 4.7 4.9 6.0 7.6 7.8 8.3 7.8 6.7 7.3 6.1 8.9 6.2 8.8
Re 9.0 8.8 9.5 11.2 13.8 13.1 14.0 15.2 14.2 14.9 17.0 17.7 13.0 11.3
Ir 14.7 14.2 16.3 16.4 17.8 18.7 19.7 19.6 19.5 20.7 17.2 14.1 14.0 15.4
Au 9.3 9.4 10.3 14.7 17.0 17.9 22.9 24.3 28.4 29.6 39.1 40.6 53.4 52.6
Pb 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.8 0.8 1.1 X X X X X X X X
χ2 contribution percentage
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contributing elements lose their signal until 800 m away, and even then, there are no 
pronounced effects due to distance until 1,000 m is reached.  At this distance, the signal 
from titanium is lost, and the signal from chromium is severely reduced in value.  At 1,200 
m, the signal from nickel, a key threshold reaction, is lost, and the cobalt rod is barely 
usable. 
 Meanwhile, the elements whose signals persist to longer ranges are accounting for 
more and more of the match chi-squared contribution.  A gold target rod would single-
handedly account for 39% of the chi-squared at 1,200 m and 6 elements account for 95% 
of the signal at that distance.  Unfortunately, these tend to be expensive elements, requiring 
tradeoffs in the optimization plan. 
 The following series of tables shows the differences in the matching and yield 
estimate scores at select distances when major contributors start to lose their usefulness: 
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Table 11 – Matching Results: χ2 and Yield at 600 m 
    χ2 value 
  Unknown Weapon 






FM 0.17 2114 1327 3.33 3.95 
FUS 367 0.16 3145 1023 980 
LB 427 2771 0.09 955 930 
WPu 2.02 2227 1358 0.12 3.32 
WU 1.66 2318 1292 3.10 0.15 
 
      
       
    Yield 






FM 15.0 kt 48.2 Mt 245.3 kt 5.2 Mt 3.4 Mt 
FUS 0.01 t 15.0 kt 0.14 t 2.4 kt 1.6 kt 
LB 1.3 kt 16.9 Mt 15.0 kt 673.6 kt 418.7 kt 
WPu 0.04 t 137.6 kt 0.70 t 15.0 kt 9.7 kt 
WU 0.07 t 211.3 kt 1.1 kt 23.2 kt 15.0 kt 
 
Table 12 – Matching Results: χ2 and Yield at 800 m 
    χ2 value 
  Unknown Weapon 






FM 0.25 860 432 2.86 3.90 
FUS 141 0.20 1327 571 537 
LB 104 1215 0.07 315 282 
WPu 2.17 924 421 0.12 3.16 
WU 1.56 958 393 2.78 0.10 
 
      
       
    Yield 






FM 15.0 kt 53.9 Mt 139.5 kt 5.2 Mt 3.4 Mt 
FUS 0.01 t 15.0 kt 0.06 t 1.8 kt 1.2 kt 
LB 1.7 kt 15.0 Mt 15.0 kt 843.6 kt 534.3 kt 
WPu 0.04 t 154.3 kt 0.40 t 15.0 kt 9.7 kt 
WU 0.07 t 239.0 kt 0.61 t 23.3 kt 15.0 kt 
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At these distances, there is not yet a major loss in the ability to discriminate most spectra 
(compared to the default scenario in Table 4, page 57).  The ability to differentiate the WPu 
and WU spectrum has been reduced somewhat and this pair are the hardest to discriminate 
since they are the most similar.  Also, of note is that the relatively low match chi-squared 
score between the FM and the two Watt spectra is deceiving; the yield for those near 
matches is several orders of magnitude off of the expected value of 15 kt.  In an actual 
situation, the wildly inaccurate yield would indicate a poor match.  Moving out to 1,200 
m, the first incorrect match with a chi-squared very close to 1 appears, though its yield is 
very incorrect. 
 
Table 13 – Matching Results: χ2 and Yield at 1,200 m 
    χ2 value 
  Unknown Weapon 






FM 0.19 299 47.76 2.92 4.68 
FUS 36.08 0.20 182 260 244 
LB 14.92 454 0.09 80.11 67.50 
WPu 2.45 336 43.84 0.17 3.43 
WU 1.15 337 37.96 2.43 0.12 
 
      
       
    Yield 






FM 15.0 kt 65.1 Mt 84.9 kt 5.2 Mt 3.3 Mt 
FUS 0.00 t 15.0 kt 0.02 t 1.3 kt 0.87 t 
LB 2.8 kt 17.4 Mt 15.0 kt 1.1 Mt 712.9 kt 
WPu 0.04 t 188.3 kt 0.25 t 15.0 kt 9.6 kt 
WU 0.07 t 294.6 kt 0.38 t 23.5 kt 15.0 kt 
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 At 1,500 m, the signal from the FM spectra is completely lost to all elements except 
gold, which has too small of a signal to be used.  This is demonstrated by the row of X’s 
in Table 14. 
 
Table 14 – Matching Results: χ2 and Yield, 1,500 m 
    χ2 value 
  Unknown Weapon 






FM X 86.35 7.25 1.63 2.74 
FUS X 0.06 37.57 99.33 90.95 
LB X 112 0.07 15.73 12.91 
WPu X 109 11.72 0.18 1.02 
WU X 103 11.84 1.37 0.14 
 
      
       
    Yield 






FM 0.00 t 85.0 Mt 61.7 kt 5.1 Mt 3.3 Mt 
FUS 0.00 t 15.0 kt 0.01 t 0.98 t 0.63 t 
LB 0.00 t 25.1 Mt 15.1 kt 1.4 Mt 900.7 kt 
WPu 0.00 t 250.5 kt 0.18 t 15.0 kt 9.6 kt 
WU 0.00 t 393.5 kt 0.28 t 23.7 kt 15.0 kt 
 
The FM spectra is unique in that it has a relatively low neutron energy distribution at the 
initial location (see Figure 4, page 21).  Most of its neutrons emerge at less than 1 keV, and 
simply do not travel far before being absorbed or downscattered.   This weapon had a very 
massive delivery system and casing which contributes to this attenuated spectrum.  These 
features are less likely to be present in a terrorist weapon in a similar yield range as it would 
not be delivered by WWII-era aircraft bombing. 
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 At this distance, distinguishing the WPu and WU becomes more difficult, as both 
the match chi-squared scores are low and the yield estimates are reasonable amounts.  
There are also only 5 of 34 detectors available at this distance.  In a major city, there would 
be additional detectors at this distance that were not simulated in this work.  Since the 
previous AFIDS work [2] established a melting danger range of about 400 m for a 15 kt 
weapon, the default scenario holds up pretty well if melting distance is the primary concern. 
4.2.1.2 Maximum Distance or Less 
 A set of scenarios was run using a variable maximum distance.  In keeping with the 
previous results and the established melting criteria, a minimum distance of 400 m was 
included in each scenario.  Maximum distances of 600 – 1,500 m were tested. 
 Looking at a very restrictive case – only using the two detectors between 500 and 
600 m from the explosion – reasonable matching and yield results were obtained, shown 
in Table 15 below: 
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Table 15 – Matching Results: χ2 and Yield, 500 m < Distance < 600 m 
    χ2 value 
  Unknown Weapon 






FM 0.12 10842 329 681 643 
FUS 289 0.21 272 3630 1705 
LB 106 9288 0.04 595 289 
WPu 207 10150 145 0.17 5.32 
WU 191 10106 132 6.56 0.11 
 
      
       
    Yield 






FM 15.0 kt 150.0 Mt 447.4 kt 3.6 Mt 2.4 Mt 
FUS 0.02 t 15.0 kt 0.58 t 3.9 kt 2.7 kt 
LB 0.47 t 150.0 Mt 15.0 kt 117.1 kt 77.1 kt 
WPu 0.06 t 22.7 Mt 2.0 kt 15.0 kt 10.0 kt 
WU 0.09 t 51.7 Mt 3.1 kt 22.7 kt 15.0 kt 
 
Between the match chi-squared scores and yield estimates, the closer-in detectors 
compensate for their lack of total detectors (and thus countable locations) with a very high 
signal.  Therefore, while maximum distance will be a significant planning factor for the 
contingency operations plan, it does not affect the optimization of detector target rods. 
4.2.2 Azimuth (Avoiding Fallout Zones) 
 Nuclear detonations near ground level tend to create radioactive fallout plumes in 
the direction of the prevailing winds in the aftermath of the explosion.  These fallout areas 
will have high residual radiation levels for some time after the incident and will be more 
difficult or impossible for personnel to enter to collect AFIDS detectors.   
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 A reasonable contingency plan would be to collect detectors that are not near the 
fallout plume first to start the counting process and thus more quickly obtain some results.  
This plan assumes that a slice of the available detectors centered in the direction of the 
fallout plume may be safely ignored while still producing good discrimination.  The 
robustness of the overall plan as well as each element’s contribution to match chi-squared 
was tested by running 13 scenarios, where 60-degree swathes of detectors are excluded 
(centered on the angle listed, with 0 degrees being due north).  The first scenario in Table 
16 below includes all detectors as a comparison. 
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Table 16 – Matching Results: χ2 and Yield, 60° Angle Exclusions, > 400 m distance 
 
 
The results here are very consistent with regards to the exclusion angle.  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to exclude a section of detectors in a 60 degree fallout plume without adversely 
affecting results. 
4.2.3 Height Above Ground 
 The detector’s height above ground level in an urban environment has positive and 
negative effects on the AFIDS effort.  Placing detectors higher in altitude can reduce 
All 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330
Mg 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.4
Al 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.5
Ti 2.8 2.8 3.6 3.4 2.8 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.8 2.7 2.8
Cr 8.6 6.6 8.6 8.6 8.7 9.2 9.1 8.9 9.0 9.2 8.7 8.8 8.6
Fe 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
Co 4.4 2.5 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.3 4.5 4.4
Ni 5.8 6.4 7.0 6.7 5.7 4.7 4.7 5.3 5.4 5.0 5.6 5.8 5.7
Cu 11.1 9.7 11.2 11.2 11.0 11.7 11.6 11.2 11.4 11.6 10.9 11.0 11.1
Ge 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
Zr 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Mo 2.4 1.8 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.3 2.4 2.3
Rh 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Pd 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
Cd 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.7
Sn 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Hf 7.4 4.5 7.6 7.8 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.3 7.2 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.5
Ta 8.1 9.3 7.9 7.8 8.1 8.2 8.1 8.3 8.1 8.1 8.3 8.1 8.0
W  5.0 6.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.1 5.0 4.7 4.9 4.9 5.0
Re 9.6 10.9 8.7 9.2 9.6 9.7 9.6 9.9 10.1 9.6 9.4 9.7 9.6
Ir 16.3 17.3 16.4 16.0 16.4 16.2 16.1 16.6 16.3 16.1 16.1 15.7 16.3
Au 10.3 13.3 8.2 9.0 10.1 10.7 11.0 10.7 10.5 10.4 10.5 10.8 10.3
Pb 1.7 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.7
χ2 contribution percentage
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localized scattering effects, such as close-by bodies of water or buildings.  The urban 
canyon effects, while not eliminated, are somewhat reduced.  A higher proportion of the 
incoming fluence may be due to skyshine, which consists of higher energy neutrons that 
have scattered less than their low energy counterparts.  Higher placement locations may 
also reduce the risk of theft or vandalism. 
 Drawbacks to higher detector positions include the greater expense of installing the 
detectors, as skilled personnel such as electrical line crews or cell phone tower crews may 
have to be hired.  They are also more difficult to check on and maintain.  Additionally, 
retrieving the detectors post-explosion will require coordination for specialized crews 
capable of safely climbing the supporting structures. 
 Scenarios were created based on the default scenario with different minimum height 
filters ranging from 5 m to 50 m above local ground level.  The change in match chi-




Table 17 – Match Chi-Squared Contribution vs. Minimum Detector Height (m) 
  Percentage of χ2 contribution 
Ht 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 50 
Mg  1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.2 1.1 1.1 
Al  1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Ti  2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.8 3.6 
Cr  8.6 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.3 7.5 7.6 7.9 6.1 6.6 
Fe  0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Co  4.4 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.5 2.6 2.7 3.0 2.6 2.6 
Ni  5.8 6.0 5.9 6.1 6.2 6.7 7.0 6.3 7.5 9.6 
Cu  11.1 11.3 11.5 11.4 11.3 10.4 11.1 12.2 8.0 7.6 
Ge  0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 
Zr  0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Mo  2.4 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.8 2.6 
Rh  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Pd  0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Cd  1.6 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.8 
Sn  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Hf  7.4 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.0 4.4 4.5 4.4 4.1 4.8 
Ta  8.1 8.3 8.2 8.3 8.5 9.7 9.5 9.5 8.9 9.1 
W   5.0 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.8 5.6 5.5 5.3 6.2 6.6 
Re  9.6 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.6 10.3 10.6 10.6 12.7 11.3 
Ir  16.3 15.3 15.2 15.2 15.2 15.5 15.2 14.9 16.8 17.4 
Au  10.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.4 12.9 12.4 12.9 14.1 10.2 
Pb  1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.2 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.7 
 
Of note, the nickel detector’s relative contribution increased with height.  Since the best 
nickel reaction has a high energy threshold, this can be explained by the increased portion 
of high energy skyshine reaching the targets at higher altitudes.  Conversely, elements with 
low or no threshold energy reactions gradually contribute less with minimum heights. 
 The highest cut off tested, 50 m, still produced good matching and yield scores as 
shown in Table 18 below: 
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Table 18 – Matching Results: χ2 and Yield, Height > 50 m 
    χ2 value 
  Unknown Weapon 






FM 0.30 5000 978 5.02 4.39 
FUS 267 0.11 2207 935 718 
LB 328 4265 0.05 646 589 
WPu 3.23 9374 956 0.13 3.06 
WU 1.95 9323 951 3.97 0.07 
 
      
       
    Yield 






FM 15.0 kt 54.3 Mt 266.0 kt 5.2 Mt 3.4 Mt 
FUS 0.01 t 15.0 kt 0.17 t 2.5 kt 1.7 kt 
LB 1.2 kt 150.0 Mt 15.0 kt 477.8 kt 301.9 kt 
WPu 0.04 t 15.1 Mt 0.79 t 15.0 kt 9.8 kt 
WU 0.07 t 30.4 Mt 1.2 kt 23.2 kt 15.0 kt 
 
Detectors in high locations serve the AFIDS process well.  There is some decrease in the 
discrimination of two low-energy spectra, FM and WU, which is not unexpected since the 
proportion of lower energy neutrons reaching the detectors is reduced.  Incorporating the 
yield factors makes it easy to still distinguish these spectra.  The utility of detectors placed 
high above the ground should go into the planning process for actual positioning and 
deployment. 
4.2.4 Threshold Reactions 
 Threshold reactions are neutron activation reactions that only occur when the 
incoming neutron energy exceeds a minimum value.  Below this threshold, the cross 
section and thus probability of the reaction happening is zero.  Most elements which have 
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threshold reactions also can undergo a number of non-threshold reactions.  This causes 
these materials to generate activations and counts from low-energy neutrons, which is a 
double-edged sword. 
 Counting low-energy neutrons can help get sufficient activations and counts in 
borderline cases on lower yield or lower energy leakage spectrum weapons, or at further 
distances.  For some specific weapons like the highly attenuated FM spectrum, they are the 
only way to get usable data.  Looking at Figure 4 (page 21), the majority of neutrons from 
that weapons start below 1 keV.  These neutrons do not travel as far without scattering or 
absorption as high-energy neutrons do.  Also, the higher energy neutrons tend to lose 
energy as they scatter, with the fluence values at lower energy levels becoming noisier 
further from the source.  Low energy neutrons are also more sensitive to very local 
scattering conditions. 
 In contrast, higher energy neutrons can travel further with fewer scattering events, 
are easily discernible from background noise, and are present in distinguishable quantities 
from most spectra.  Weapons with a fusion component produce a 14.1 MeV peak that is 
especially noticeable, and that also produces high energy downscattered neutrons.  On the 
downside, there may be fewer of these neutrons produced, and for most elements they are 
more difficult to capture.  The quality of the signal they produce is high, but it is harder to 
obtain enough counts, especially from lower energy spectrum weapons. 
 All the tables up to this point have included all possible reactions without an energy 
threshold.  In this section, the effects of filter energies including 10, 25, 50, 100, 250, 500, 
and 750 keV, as well as 1 and 2 MeV, will be tested.  The first set of scenarios will consider 
 98 
the thresholds alone (with the established 400 m minimum distance to avoid melting, which 
is now added to the default scenario parameters), and subsequent sets will consider the 
thresholds in addition to other restrictions.  The threshold direct effects are shown in Table 
19 below: 
 
Table 19 – Match Chi-Squared Contribution vs. Threshold Energy (keV) 
  χ2 contribution percentage 
  0 10 25 50 100 250 500 750 1000 2000 
Mg  1.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 7.8 7.8 14.4 
Al  1.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 4.9 4.9 8.9 
Ti  2.8 23.6 25.1 21.1 23.0 23.7 25.1 7.7 7.8 14.2 
Cr  8.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Fe  0.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 X X X 
Co  4.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 2.7 2.6 3.9 
Ni  5.8 56.7 55.2 59.2 57.3 56.6 55.2 2.2 2.2 3.2 
Cu  11.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 2.4 2.4 3.6 
Ge  0.4 X X X X X X X X X 
Zr  0.4 X X X X X X X X X 
Mo  2.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.1 
Rh  0.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 22.8 22.7 X 
Pd  0.5 X X X X X X X X X 
Cd  1.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.2 1.2 1.4 
Sn  0.3 X X X X X X X X X 
Hf  7.4 X X X X X X X X X 
Ta  8.1 X X X X X X X X X 
W   5.0 X X X X X X X X X 
Re  9.6 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 12.9 12.9 14.2 
Ir  16.3 X X X X X X X X X 
Au  10.3 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 33.3 33.3 33.8 
Pb  1.7 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 
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 Immediately noticeable are the 7 elements that do not have a threshold reaction at 
all.  The modeling code applies the threshold by filtering out reactions that do not have a 
threshold above the selected energy level, so elements that have no threshold reactions are 
filtered out quickly.  Other elements like titanium and nickel have different threshold 
reactions, and as the minimum threshold level rises, the code selects different reactions for 
those elements.  In these cases, the second reaction with that higher energy requirement 
creates fewer activations and less signal.  This is apparent for nickel which has its primary 
threshold reaction 58Ni(n,p)58Co give way to the higher threshold reaction 58Ni(n,np)57Co 
at the 750 keV filter level.  This second reaction is far less useful, making a natural cut off 
for nickel in the 500 keV threshold range.  Some elements like rhodium are consistent 
regardless of the neutron energy filter level, but see their relative contribution rise as other 
elements are excluded due to rising thresholds. 
 There is a sharp change in contributions between the 500 keV and 750 keV 
thresholds, with several contributors no longer of value in the assessment.  Looking back 
at the energy dependence of the how the detector body affects the incoming fluence (see 
Figure 10, page 74), the largest effects are isolated below 500 keV.  Therefore the 500 keV 
threshold could help improve the quality of the signal while avoiding or minimizing some 
of the angular effects studied earlier.  This 500 keV threshold will now be applied with 
select other constraints to see the effects on match chi-squared scoring, yield values, and 
countable locations. 
4.2.5 Time Delay in Start of Counts 
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 It is difficult to predict how long of a delay will be required from the time of a 
nuclear explosion until a given AFIDS detector can be collected, brought to a counting lab, 
and counted.  Not only do emergency crews have to deal with the chaos, damage, and 
radiation of a nuclear explosion, there could also be difficulties in reaching select detectors 
on places like surviving cell phone towers.  There is also a limited throughput for the 
counting lab – only so many samples can be counted at one time – leading to additional 
delays.  These delays can be mitigated through good planning of the order of counting, but 
not entirely controlled. 
 The default scenario uses a 72 hour delay before the start of counting.  In this 
section, the effects on matching chi-squared contribution by varying the delay time before 
the start of counts are examined.  Delays ranging from 12 hours to 1 year are considered, 
with the most attention given to the first week after the explosion.   
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Table 20 – Match χ2 Contribution vs. Delay Time in Start of Counts 
  χ2 contribution percentage 
  12h 24h 36h 2d 3d 4d 5d 6d 7d 10d 30d 1y 
Mg  2.3 2.4 2.1 2.4 1.4 0.6 0.1 X X X X X 
Al  2.6 2.6 2.2 2.5 1.4 0.6 0.1 X X X X X 
Ti  1.5 1.6 1.5 2.0 2.8 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.5 0.9 0.1 X 
Cr  7.5 7.5 9.1 8.9 8.7 9.1 9.0 9.4 10.2 11.4 12.2 X 
Fe  1.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 X X 
Co  3.4 3.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.8 5.0 5.6 6.8 14.8 
Ni  1.5 2.0 2.8 3.6 6.0 6.9 7.0 7.4 7.8 8.5 6.6 1.9 
Cu  16.5 15.6 19.3 16.4 11.1 8.6 6.4 5.3 3.6 X X X 
Ge  0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 X X X X X 
Zr  0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.5 X X 
Mo  2.0 2.0 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 0.2 X 
Rh  0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.9 1.2 
Pd  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 X X X X 
Cd  1.4 1.4 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.1 X X 
In  0.0 0.0 0.0 X X X X X X X X X 
Sn  0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 X 
Hf  4.3 4.4 6.4 6.6 7.4 8.2 6.8 7.0 7.3 7.7 9.3 5.7 
Ta  4.0 4.3 6.7 7.2 8.0 9.2 8.6 8.9 9.3 10.0 13.8 27.3 
W   3.2 3.2 4.9 4.7 5.0 4.6 3.6 3.3 3.2 2.1 0.2 X 
Re  30.5 30.8 7.9 8.3 9.6 10.8 8.8 8.8 8.9 8.8 4.8 X 
Ir  9.9 10.2 16.0 16.0 16.2 16.0 26.8 27.5 28.3 30.1 39.8 49.1 
Au  4.9 5.3 8.4 9.1 10.2 11.5 10.2 10.2 9.9 10.1 4.1 X 
Pb  0.7 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.7 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.2 X X 
 
Copper’s rise and fall in matching contribution is based on the 12.7 hour half-life of its 
most useful activation product, 64Cu.  This relatively short half-life leads to an initially high 
decay and thus count rate immediately after the explosion.  Copper contributes over 15% 
for any count time starting in the first 48 hours after the explosion, and actually increase to 
over 19% at the 36 hour mark, as very short half-life activation products of elements like 
rhenium decay away.  At the 72 hour mark, it has undergone almost 6 half-lives, but still 
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contributes a healthy 11% to the overall matching score.  By the end of the first week, it 
has almost completely decayed away and is uncountable 10 days after the explosion. 
 In contrast, tantalum’s 182Ta activation product has a 114.43 day half-life.  While 
this long half-life reduces the decay and count rates, it retains countable activity for a 
reasonably long time.  Initially tantalum only contributes 4.0% to the matching score totals, 
but steadily increases in importance as shorter-lived activation products decay away, 
exceeding 10% of the score contribution 10 days after the explosion.  Only the very 
expensive iridium target rod is a greater contributor after 10 days or even at one year. 
 While a year long delay in counting would be impractical from an immediate 
nuclear forensics effort, it could be useful for long term scientific studies.  Decades after 
the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, scientists are building ever-improving 
models of the radiation dose to the survivors.  Technology, especially computing power 
for modeling, was unthinkable in the aftermath of those explosions.  Likewise, the future 
may hold tools unimaginable today.  Providing longer-lived activation products to future 
scientists could help survivors in unanticipated ways.  While long-lived activation products 
are not a primary driver of the AFIDS optimization, if they can be included for a low 
expense and opportunity cost, they should be. 
 For the non-threshold reactions, copper stands out for matching contributions 
versus cost per target rod, though it has a somewhat short half-life and would need to be 
prioritized in the counting process.  Rhenium and iridium complement each other with 
short and longer half-lives, but rhenium is very expensive, and iridium is almost 
prohibitively expensive – only half-length rods would fit inside the current AFIDS budget.  
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Chromium stands out as a longer-lived inexpensive alternative.  Cobalt also offers longer 
half-life performance but is still significantly expensive.  Tungsten only has modest 
performance but is an exceptional value due to its low cost. 
 Given the utility of reactions with neutron energy thresholds discussed in section 
4.2.4 (page 96), another set of scenarios was run with a 500-keV filer on required incident 
neutron energy, an increased yield of 150 kt to allow more reactions to be counted24, and 
the same delay time parameters.  The results are in Table 21 below: 
  
                                                 
 
24 The threshold reactions are most useful for either high-energy fission spectra (WPu is 
the only unclassified spectrum in this category) or spectra with some fusion component 
(only FUS in the unclassified spectrum list).  To better examine the threshold reactions 
that are useful for more modern weapons whose spectra include these higher-energy 
neutrons, the yield is increased to allow appreciable counts from the WU spectrum.  FM 
and LB are so attenuated by their large bomb casings and/or explosive charges that even 
a 10-fold increase in yield does not give enough counts to any threshold reactions. 
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Table 21 – Match χ2 Contribution vs. Delay Time in Start of Counts, 500 keV 
Threshold, 150 kt Yield, only FUS, WPu, WU Spectra Matched 
  χ2 contribution percentage 
  12h 24h 36h 2d 3d 4d 5d 6d 7d 10d 30d 1y 
Mg  1.7 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.2 X X X X X 
Al  1.6 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.1 X X X X X 
Ti  50.3 38.3 28.5 25.3 24.7 7.4 7.6 7.7 6.9 6.1 0.5 X 
Cr  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 X X 
Fe  1.6 0.6 X25 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 2.9 X 
Co  0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.5 X 
Ni  29.0 41.8 52.2 54.8 55.6 72.9 73.1 73.2 73.8 74.4 73.9 40.4 
Cu  2.8 1.9 1.2 0.8 0.3 0.1 X X X X X X 
Mo  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 X X 
Rh  1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.4 25.1 
Cd  0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 X X 
In  0.0 0.0 0.0 X X X X X X X X X 
Re  3.1 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.0 4.8 X 
Ir26  X X X X X X X X X X 9.2 34.5 
Au  7.3 8.6 9.5 10.2 11.1 11.6 11.9 12.2 12.4 12.9 5.8 X 
Pb  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 X X 
 
 Two inexpensive target rod elements stand out here – titanium and nickel.  The 
shorter half-life (3.3 days) of titanium’s primary activation product, 47Sc, accounts for a 
significant portion of the matching score if it can be obtained quickly and counted at 12 
                                                 
 
25 Before this gap, the contributing reaction was 56Fe(n,p)56Mn.  At the gap, this reaction 
has decayed away and the new reaction, 54Fe(n,p)54Mn has interference.  The interfering 
activation product dies away after this bin.  
26 Note that iridium does not have any available reactions until the 30 day test.  The cause 
of this is an interfering gamma ray that is much stronger than the threshold reaction’s 
gamma, until the shorter half-life interfering activation product decays away enough 
where it no longer causes significant interference. 
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hours after detonation.  It maintains a very high relative contribution through the first 3 
days and remains important all the way through the first week, before starting to fade in 
usefulness at the 10 day mark.  Nickel’s primary activation product, 58Co, has a half-life of 
70.86 days.  This long-lived isotope contributes immediately after the explosion, and as 
shorter-lived activation products decay away, the nickel target rod starts to dominate the 
contribution, reaching 74% of the total contribution after 10 days.  Nickel still has a usable 
count rate after a year.  It must be noted that a large portion of nickel’s contribution to the 
matching score is focused on fusion/fission discrimination, with smaller contributions to 
fission/fission discrimination. 
 Titanium and nickel are inexpensive and have complementary half-lives, making 
them an excellent potential pairing for threshold reaction selections.  Magnesium has a 
short-lived activation product worth considering.  Gold also provides a solid threshold 
reaction, but at a high price per target rod.  An advantage for gold is that it provides more 
usable counts at lower yield levels, more so than any other long-lived activation product.  
Iron has only a modest contribution but is very inexpensive and its threshold activation 
product is long-lived. 
4.2.6 Summary of Candidate Target Rod Elements 
 This subsection summarizes the observations so far by element, capturing each 
candidate elements’ useful qualities, limitations, and costs.  Half of the commercially-
available elements did not significantly contribute to the matching discrimination process 
in any of the scenarios modelled so far and will be dropped from further consideration.  
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The elements dropped at this point are Si, Ge, Zr, Nb, Mo, Rh, Pd, Ag, Cd, In, Sn, Pb, and 
Bi.  The remaining elements are summarized in Table 22. 
Table 22 – Summary of Candidate Target Rod Elements 
            
  Cost Thresh Prod Half-life Notes 
Mg $18.94 Yes 24Na 15.0 h Good fission/fusion discrimination in 
first 24 hours 
Al $0.06 Yes 24Na 15.0 h Very cheap low signal for 2-7 days 
Ti $0.59 Yes 47Sc 3.35 d Excellent fission/fusion discrimination 
for 10 days 
Cr $0.85 No 51Cr 27.8 d Cheap fission/fission discrimination for 
10 days 
Fe $0.10 Yes 54Mn 312 d Very cheap threshold reaction, very 
long-lived 




No 60Co 5.27 y Expensive but long-lived no threshold 
Ni $0.35 Yes 58Co 70.86 d Cheap, long-lived threshold reaction 
Cu $0.06 Yes 64Cu 12.7 h Cheap, short-lived fission/fission 
discrimination 
Hf $10.50 No 181Hf 42.4 d Long-lived modest contributor 
Ta $4.13 No 182Ta 114 d Very long-lived contributor for 
fission/fission 
W $0.59 No 187W 23.7 h Cheap, modest contributor for the first 10 
days 




No 188Re 17.0 h Very high contributor for first day; high 
price 
Ir $390.24 No 194Ir 171 d Best very long-lived contributor; extreme 
price 
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Au $97.80 Yes 196Au 6.17 d Best for low yields, good for 30 days; 
high price 
    No 198Au 2.70 d Best threshold reaction for 30 days; high 
price 
4.2.7 Dimension and Number of Target Rods 
 In addition to narrowing down and selecting elements as target rods (the primary 
aim of this optimization research), improvements in performance can be gained by 
including two or more copies of the same element, including half-length rods (especially 
for expensive elements), and altering the diameter of the rod to create more mass.  The 
current AFIDS detector body configuration allows for 20 target rod slots of 5 cm in length 
and 1 mm in diameter.  The actual holes are 1.5 mm in diameter to allow for easy removal 
of the target rods. 
 Modestly increasing the diameter of select target rods is feasible, though it may add 
to the cost of the detector body as the ratio of hole width to body width increases the 
machining costs.  An extrusion process is possible when the detector bodies are 
manufactured at scale which may avoid this additional cost.  It is reasonable to expect that 
the AFIDS detector could accommodate select 2 mm diameter rods in 2.5 mm holes given 
the current setup.   
 A 2 mm diameter rod boasts 4 times the mass of a 1 mm diameter rod of the same 
length, and ignoring additional self-attenuation, will produce 4 times as many initial 
activations.  This could prove very valuable for useful target rod elements that struggle to 
obtain enough activations from lower neutron energy spectra or lower yield weapons.  This 
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also can make best use of the inexpensive elements where quadrupling the mass of the rod 
will have little effect on the overall price of a detector target rod set.   
 There is a non-trivial loss to the gamma escape probabilities however, leading to 
an optimal trade-off between increasing the total number of activations and losing gamma 
escape to self-absorption in the rods.  Simulations of 2 mm diameter rod sizes for nickel 
and titanium using the gamma escape probability code from section 3.2.2.1 (page 38) are 
shown in Figure 15, which displays the ratio of expected counts between an increased 
diameter rod versus the standard 1 mm rod.  The gammas from the preferred activation 
reactions for those two elements have the sole markers on the line.   
 The analysis showed that the increase in self-attenuation of emitted gammas was 
fairly small when only going from 1 mm to 2 mm diameter for the target elements at high 
enough energies, capturing more than 95% of the expected gain from the additional mass.  
At lower energies, the ratio would be closer to 2, because only gammas emitted near the 
surface would be likely to escape, and doubling the diameter only roughly doubles the 
surface area.  Due to the energy dependence, these numbers will be specifically calculated 




Figure 15 – Count Ratios vs. Energy for Select 2mm:1mm Diameter Target Rods 
 
 Another way to increase the number of activations and counts of the target elements 
is to include multiple copies of the same rod.  With 20 available slots and only 14 usable 
candidate elements, this is a very inviting solution, especially with low-cost elements.  As 
long as the number of duplicate rods remains reasonable in number (less than 10) the 
counting geometry and efficiency will not be significantly impacted.  Including multiple 
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copies and dispersing them angularly can assist in minimizing the angular effects discussed 
in section 4.1.1.2 (page 71). 
 The final dimension considered is the length of the target rods.  The cost of a target 
rod can be reduced linearly by reducing the length of the rod.  This makes the most sense 
for the very expensive elements such as gold and iridium that activate well and can afford 
a reduction in mass while remaining countable.  Cutting the length in half is the only way 
it would be possible to afford iridium under the budget constraint, and even then, it would 
financially crowd out many other options. 
4.3 Selection of Target Foil Set within Cost Constraints 
 In this section, using previously developed goals and desired capabilities of the 
AFIDS detector system, an optimized set of target rod elements and associated quantities 
and dimensions are presented along with a distribution pattern for the angular slots in the 
detector.  It is important to re-emphasize that these selections are based solely on the five 
unclassified weapons neutron leakage spectra available for this research.  The rules and 
analysis developed here will be useful for more generalized spectra sets and larger 
quantities of spectra, but the final optimized result can only be as good as the data used to 
build it. 
4.3.1 Summary of Optimization Criteria 
 In previous sections, the following objectives, desired capabilities, and other 
considerations have been developed: 
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1. The budget for target rod elements is limited to $200 for each detector’s set, and 
pricing is based on a minimum order of 1,000 rods (costs are listed in Table 8, page 
63). 
2. The minimum weapon yield used for this study is 15 kt.  Lower yields could require 
closer spacing of detectors than has been considered in this research.  Higher yields 
are easier to detect as they produce more neutrons. 
3. A target element must have a minimum count rate of 1,000 counts per hour after a 
set delay post-detonation, normally 72 hours.  Achieving this count rate depends on 
both the initial activation level and the half-life of the activation product.  This 
count rate also depends on the escape probabilities of the gammas rays from the rod 
as well as the energy-dependent absolute efficiency of a typical HPGe detector.  
Combinations of detector location / target element that do not meet this threshold, 
required for desired levels of uncertainties in the forensic analysis, are discarded.  
Multiple target rods of the same element can be in the holder and may be counted 
simultaneously to meet the detection threshold. 
4. The most important part of the contribution to discrimination of different spectra is 
the ability to generate high matching chi-squared scores for incorrect spectra (high 
scores meaning that there is a poor match.)  This was determined to be more useful 
and important than how low the scores are for a correct match. 
5. The target rod set needs to be able to discriminate strongly between fission and 
fusion spectra. 
6. The target rod set needs to be able to discriminate strongly between different fission 
spectra, especially closely-related spectra like WPu and WU. 
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7. The target rod set needs to have at least on target rod with sufficient activity after 
10 days to be counted.  It is desired but not required to have target rods that would 
have sufficient activity to be counted much longer times after the event than 10 
days. 
8. The target rod set needs some rod(s) that have threshold reactions to help mitigate 
the noise in the lower neutron energies due to the complexity of urban terrain.  
These reactions are also less susceptible to the angular effects detailed in section 
4.1.1.2 (page 71). 
9. When determining how many elements effectively cover a given spectrum, a single 
target element should not depend on less than 4 detector locations for its signal if 
at all possible.  While even single countable locations will be used in the AFIDS 
effort, a single detector cannot be relied upon to ensure coverage for a given 
spectrum.  Not every detector is likely to be recovered quickly, even outside of the 
melting zone and the fallout plume.  Having multiple countable locations generated 
from a variety of unknown spectra is necessary to not waste precious counting time 
and to ensure a good signal is found. 
10. It is desired but not required to have multiple copies of key target rods dispersed in 
the angular slots of the detector to minimize the angular effects discussed in section 
4.1.1.2 (page 71). 
4.3.2 Second Candidate Element Screening 
 The two questions that a complete target rod set must answer are “which elements 
to include?” and “how much of each element?”  This section seeks to answer the first 
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question, with the subsequent section further optimizing the set by answering the second 
question. 
 Looking at Table 22 (page 106), a few candidate elements are appreciably more 
expensive than the remaining elements.  To justify the cost under a constrained budget, 
these pricey elements must perform significantly better than their inexpensive peers.  In 
the case of iridium, the most expensive element, it is the very best element at providing a 
large matching score contribution very long times (1 month, 1 year) after the weapon 
detonation.  However, tantalum covers a very similar performance space at just over 1/100th 
of the cost.  Therefore, iridium can be inexpensively replaced and will not be used in the 
optimized system. 
 Rhenium, the next most expensive element, proves only to be a modest performer 
for threshold reaction, and, while it is a strong contributor during the first day for non-
threshold reactions, it is unlikely that many detectors will be recovered quickly enough to 
obtain good Re count rates.  Further, elements like tungsten can perform this task, if not as 
well, for 1/200th of the price.  So, rhenium is also eliminated. 
 Gold is the next most expensive element.  It is by far the easiest element to activate 
and maintain good count rates on, especially for low neutron energy spectra and low-yield 
weapons.  There is something to be said for including the element that provides the greatest 
number of countable locations over a range of testing conditions when anticipating working 
in a very difficult environment.  The ease with which it activates makes it a candidate to 
be used in half the standard rod height to save money.  Per Table 23, gold still performs 




Table 23 – Countable Locations vs. Mass Multiplier, Au 
  Countable Locations vs. Mass Multiplier, Au 
  0.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 12 16 24 
FM 24 27 29 30 30 30 30 30 30 31 32 32 
FUS 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
LB 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
WPu 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
WU 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
 
This table shows how many (out of a possible 32 detector locations located outside 400 
meters from the detonation) gold would register sufficient counts on in the default scenario.  
The mass multipliers ranging from 0.5 (one half of a 1 mm diameter by 5 cm standard 
target rod) to 24 (the equivalent of 24 standard rods, most likely by having 6 rods of 2 mm 
diameter) show how countable locations are gained with additional mass.  In this case, gold 
reaches the maximum much sooner, but most elements do not.  Since gold performs 
exceptionally well at providing countable locations even at low mass, it will be considered 
for the final optimized set, despite its cost. 
 The next most expensive element is cobalt.  At less than half the price of gold, a 
single cobalt rod would still absorb more than one fifth of the budget for an individual 
detector.  While its threshold reaction would not be worthwhile, the analysis of its non-
threshold reaction shows the longest half-life of all the remaining activation products at 




Table 24 – Countable Locations vs. Mass Multiplier, Co  
  Countable Locations vs. Mass Multiplier, Co 
  0.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 12 16 24 
FM 0 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 6 6 6 
FUS 21 24 28 28 30 30 30 30 30 31 31 32 
LB 5 6 6 7 8 9 10 10 10 10 12 14 
WPu 14 16 18 18 21 21 21 21 21 22 25 27 
WU 10 14 17 17 18 19 20 21 21 21 22 25 
 
Cobalt does not greatly benefit from additional mass beyond the standard rod – certainly 
not for the increases in cost that would occur.  It has a healthy number of countable 
locations for 4 of the 5 spectra and only very expensive amounts would increase that 
number.  Since it potentially offers good performance with the equivalent of a single rod, 
it remains in consideration. 
 Next on the price list is magnesium.  Less than half the price of cobalt, it is the most 
expensive element that would be considered for multiple rods.  However, its 15 hour half-
life only contributes significantly to fission/fusion discrimination on the first day.  Its lack 
of longevity combined with price leave better alternatives and it will be omitted from 
further consideration. 
 Hafnium is available for just over $10 per standard rod.  While its overall 
contributions to activation are modest, the products are long-lived.  An examination of 
hafnium’s countable locations is below in Table 25: 
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Table 25 – Countable Locations vs. Mass Multiplier, Hf 
  Countable Locations vs. Mass Multiplier, Hf 
  0.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 12 16 24 
FM 3 6 6 6 8 9 10 10 10 12 14 15 
FUS 30 31 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
LB 10 10 14 15 16 16 16 17 17 18 18 21 
WPu 21 22 27 28 29 30 30 30 30 30 30 31 
WU 20 21 25 27 28 28 28 29 30 30 30 30 
 
Much like gold, it has a large number of countable locations even at the standard rod size.  
There is a noticeable improvement in picking up the low energy spectra (FM, LB) when 
going up to 2 standard rods, which mostly levels off after 3 rods.  It is a candidate for 
inclusion. 
 For the remaining elements, cost is less of a concern.  Even using 20 standard rods’ 
worth of tantalum (the next most expensive rod) would not use half of the original budget.  
Therefore, the remaining discussion focuses on utility of the elements and the opportunity 
cost of target rod slot availability, especially on elements that would benefit from higher 
mass multipliers. 
 Tantalum provides great discrimination between similar fission spectra and its 




Table 26 – Countable Locations vs. Mass Multiplier, Ta 
  Countable Locations vs. Mass Multiplier, Ta 
  0.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 12 16 24 
FM 12 15 17 18 19 20 21 21 21 21 24 26 
FUS 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
LB 18 21 21 22 24 26 27 27 27 28 29 30 
WPu 30 31 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
WU 30 30 31 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
 
This element has excellent number of countable locations with one standard rod.  Given its 
utility, it is a likely candidate for the final optimized set. 
 The next element, chromium, costs less than a dollar per standard rod.  It provides 
inexpensive fission spectra discrimination over the first 10 days.  Its countable locations 
are in Table 27. 
 
Table 27 – Countable Locations vs. Mass Multiplier, Cr 
  Countable Locations vs. Mass Multiplier, Cr 
  0.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 12 16 24 
FM 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 
FUS 16 18 21 21 22 25 26 26 27 28 29 30 
LB 3 3 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 8 10 
WPu 7 10 14 14 16 17 17 17 17 18 20 21 
WU 6 8 10 12 14 14 17 17 17 17 18 20 
 
Chromium shows gradually increased performance with increased mass multipliers and 
then plateauing after 4 standard rod equivalents.  It does not have the large number of 
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countable locations that gold does, but it provides a healthy amount of data on 4 of the 5 
spectra and will be included. 
 Titanium is the first threshold reaction that combines a reasonable cost with 
coverage that lasts the initial 10 days after the blast.  Like other threshold reactions, 
countable locations are a concern, since low energy neutrons cannot activate its preferred 
reaction.  A breakdown is in Table 28 below: 
 
Table 28 – Countable Locations vs. Mass Multiplier, Ti 
  Countable Locations vs. Mass Multiplier, Ti 
  0.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 12 16 24 
FM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FUS 9 11 13 15 17 18 19 20 20 20 21 22 
LB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WPu 0 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 6 8 
WU 0 0 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 
 
With a single standard rod, titanium can only detect the fusion spectra.  While 
discriminating fission and fusion is its strength, increasing its mass multiplier dramatically 
allows it to perform on more fission spectra.  This may be practical using 2 mm diameter 
rods due to its low cost.  Titanium and nickel complement each other well and both will be 
included. 
 Tungsten also provides coverage over the first ten days, and is a non-threshold 




Table 29 – Countable Locations vs. Mass Multiplier, W 
  Countable Locations vs. Mass Multiplier, W 
  0.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 12 16 24 
FM 12 15 17 18 20 21 21 21 21 21 24 26 
FUS 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
LB 18 21 21 23 24 26 26 27 27 28 29 30 
WPu 30 31 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
WU 30 30 31 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
 
A single rod of tungsten sufficiently activates at numerous detector locations.  Combining 
this with its low cost and longer half-life lead to its inclusion. 
 Nickel provides the next threshold reaction.  While it does not contribute as much 
matching score as titanium initially, it does excellent fusion discrimination and has a long 
half-life.  It also has limited countable locations as shown in Table 30. 
 
Table 30 – Countable Locations vs. Mass Multiplier, Ni 
  Countable Locations vs. Mass Multiplier, Ni 
  0.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 12 16 24 
FM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FUS 11 13 17 19 20 20 20 21 21 22 23 26 
LB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WPu 2 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 8 8 10 
WU 0 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 7 8 
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Nickel can barely detect the WPu and WU spectra (in addition to FUS) with one standard 
rod.  However, dramatically increasing its mass to 12 or 16 standard masses allows it to 
work with both WPu and WU, contributing to the higher energy fission spectra.  It is a 
candidate for multiple 2 mm diameter rod use due to its low cost. 
 Iron is the next element considered.  It is exceptionally cheap and its activation 
product has a very long half-life.  A look at its countable locations is in Table 31. 
 
Table 31 – Countable Locations vs. Mass Multiplier, Fe 
  Countable Locations vs. Mass Multiplier, Fe 
  0.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 12 16 24 
FM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FUS 0 2 3 4 5 6 6 6 6 7 8 10 
LB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
WPu 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 5 6 
WU 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 4 
 
Iron has a major flaw – it has very few countable locations, even with a large mass 
multiplier.  While paying for multiple 2mm rods would be inexpensive financially, the 
opportunity cost of having to use four slots for a pretty marginal performance is too much.  
Despite its cost, iron does not provide enough performance for inclusion. 
 The remaining elements, aluminum and copper, suffer from the same issue – a lack 
of activations leading to the need to use heavy mass multipliers to create sufficient 
countable locations.  Further, both of their half-lives are not long-lived and their matching 
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chi-squared contributions even during the short time they are countable is not impressive.  
They are both dropped from consideration. 
 After this second, more detailed screening, the remaining candidate rod elements 
are gold, cobalt, nickel, chromium, tungsten, titanium, hafnium, and tantalum.  The next 
section presents the number and dimensions of each rod, drawing from the analysis in this 
section. 
4.3.3 Determining Optimal Quantities and Sizes of Rods 
 The two major constraints in this process are the overall budget and the number of 
slots in the AFIDS detector, which cannot be arbitrarily increased, both for mechanical 
reasons and due to the eventual counting throughput limitations that become more difficult 
with an increasing number of separate elements to count.27  The most difficult to solve 
problem for the more expensive elements is the budget constraint.   
 Starting with the most expensive remaining candidate, gold, a decision must be 
made on its inclusion.  Excluding it would provide much more budget room for other 
elements.  However, in the previous section it was found that most of the other expensive 
elements were not exceptional performers, nor did they benefit greatly from large mass 
                                                 
 
27 It may be feasible to count different elements that have activation product gamma rays 
with very different energies and no other interfering gamma rays; a more detailed 
contingency operations counting plan could find those efficiencies.  They are not 
considered further here, although the ability to simultaneously count multiple rods of the 
same element is accounted for. 
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multipliers.  The elements that most benefited from multiple rods in the assembly were 
very inexpensive threshold reaction elements like titanium and nickel.  Weighing the cost 
against the irreplaceability of gold to provide quality data in low energy, low yield 
scenarios at even great distances away, the optimal decision is to include a single standard 
rod of it.  To partially mitigate the angular effects of slot position, the gold will be split into 
two half-length pieces placed 180 degrees part from each other. 
 Another expensive element is cobalt.  While it does not have the exceptional 
performance of gold, it has an unmatched activation product half-life, which provides long-
lasting data for the better analysis that comes with large counting times in optimum 
conditions.  It is also half the cost of gold and does not need a mass multiplier to obtain a 
sufficient number of countable locations.  To keep costs down and to complement gold’s 
half-length approach, a single rod of cobalt will also be split and placed with the gold target 
rods. 
 With the expensive elements accounted for, the remaining elements are unlikely to 
strain the budget.  Now the bigger constraint becomes the number of slots remaining, 
currently 18 of 20 slots.  The two elements that benefit most from mass multiplication are 
titanium and nickel, the set of threshold reaction elements who half-lives complement each 
other.  Both of these elements benefit greatly in countable locations by have 16 times the 
normal mass, which is accomplished by including 4 rods each of 2 mm diameter (quadruple 
the mass for somewhat less than quadruple the cost per the ordering catalogues).  These 
key threshold performers take up 2 sets of 4 slots each, leaving 10 remaining slots.  They 
will be placed at 90 degree intervals. 
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 The next element needing mass multiplication for optimum countable locations in 
chromium.  Unlike the threshold reactions of titanium and nickel, chromium’s non-
threshold reaction does well at the lower levels of the energy spectrum.  It will be given a 
4 times standard rod total mass, taking up 4 more slots with 1 mm diameter rods.  It would 
not benefit greatly from increased diameter.  This leaves remaining 6 slots. 
 The remaining non-threshold reactions from hafnium, tantalum, and tungsten do 
well without the mass multiplication desired in the previous few elements.  In the interest 
of providing angular diversity, they will each receive two standard rod slots, split by 180 
degrees. 
 The total costs of this set of detector rods is $182.06, meeting the budget limitation.  
If the budget were higher, an additional gold rod would be considered in lieu of the cobalt.  




Figure 16 – Optimized Detector Target Rod Set 
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Table 32 – Optimized Detector Target Rod Set 
  Target Rods 
Position Element Dia. (mm) Length (cm) Cost 
0 deg Au/Co 1 2.5 $69.95 
18 deg Ni 2 5 $1.16 
36 deg Cr 1 5 $0.85 
54 deg W 1 5 $0.59 
72 deg Ti 2 5 $0.93 
90 deg Hf 1 5 $10.50 
108 deg Ni 2 5 $1.16 
126 deg Cr 1 5 $0.85 
144 deg Ta 1 5 $4.13 
162 deg Ti 2 5 $0.93 
180 deg Au/Co 1 2.5 $69.95 
198 deg Ni 2 5 $1.16 
216 deg Cr 1 5 $0.85 
234 deg W 1 5 $0.59 
252 deg Ti 2 5 $0.93 
270 deg Hf 1 5 $10.50 
288 deg Ni 2 5 $1.16 
306 deg Cr 1 5 $0.85 
324 deg Ta 1 5 $4.13 
342 deg Ti 2 5 $0.93 
      Total: $182.06 
 
The performance of this set of target rods will now be tested in a few scenarios. 
4.3.4 Performance of Optimized Target Rod Set 
 As a baseline, the performance of the optimized detector target rod set is tested 
against the default scenario (with 400 m minimum distance to avoid melting), with results 
in Table 33 and Table 34. 
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Table 33 – Matching Results: χ2 and Yield, Optimized Detector Target Rod Set, 
Default Scenario  
    χ2 value 
    Unknown Weapon 






FM 0.16 5854 1518 250 258 
FUS 1041 0.12 4411 4338 3889 
LB 693 3399 0.06 2033 1937 
WPu 149 6597 2473 0.12 8.61 
WU 139 6685 2269 8.27 0.12 
 
      
       
    Yield 






FM 15.0 kt 141.5 Mt 320.6 kt 4.9 Mt 3.2 Mt 
FUS 0.01 t 15.0 kt 0.35 t 2.6 kt 1.8 kt 
LB 1.1 kt 114.6 Mt 15.0 kt 1.0 Mt 533.1 kt 
WPu 0.05 t 472.7 kt 1.3 kt 15.0 kt 9.7 kt 
WU 0.07 t 777.5 kt 2.0 kt 23.3 kt 15.0 kt 
 
Compared to the default scenario (Table 4, page 57) that included 27 elements regardless 
of price or ability to conduct so many counts, the 8 element optimized set performs 
exceptionally well.  The optimized set performs significantly better than the default set on 
distinguishing the two closest spectra, WPu and WU, doubling the discrimination score in 
a range that is very important.  It also improves discrimination between the fission and 
fusion spectra, doubling the score in some cases.  This is due to the yield scaling being less 
affected by elements that fail to interact with high energy neutrons. The only significant 
decrease in matching discrimination is for the unknown FM spectra against the library WPu 
and WU spectra, where the chi-squared score is reduced by 30%.  However, these scores 
are still two orders of magnitude greater than the correct match and do not cause any 
uncertainty as to the correct match.   
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Table 34 – Countable Locations, Optimized Set, Default Scenario 
  Countable Locations 
  FM FUS LB WPu WU 
Ti  0 21 0 6 4 
Cr  1 22 6 16 14 
Co  1 24 6 16 14 
Ni  0 23 0 8 6 
Hf  6 32 14 27 25 
Ta  17 32 21 32 31 
W   17 32 21 32 31 
Au  27 32 30 32 32 
 
The benefits of increasing the total mass, especially titanium and nickel, are reflected in 
Table 34.  Every element is capable of working with the FUS, WPu, and WU spectra, which 
are the most representative of likely real-world modern threats, whether from nation-states 
or terrorist organization.  The very heavy bomb casings, explosive systems, and flight 
systems of FM and LB are just not going to be recreated with modern technology, even by 
an asymmetric threat, which would not have access to a heavy capacity bomber to deliver 
such weapons.   
 Looking deeper into the matching score contributions, each element of the 
optimized set provides at least 6% of the total matching score, and the greatest contributor 
of the 8 contributes less than 23%.  The standard deviation was under five percentage 
points.  This distribution is very different than the previous iterations where a few elements 
dominated and most were meaningless.  The mass multiplication through multiple and 
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larger diameter rods helps with this, and also makes the time spent counting each element 
more productive. 
 The next test combines a few of the previous parameter restrictions such as setting 
an artificially high minimum distance of 800 meters, blocking out a 60-degree swatch of 
detectors in the direction of a notional fallout plume (centered on 30 degrees east of due 
north), and increasing the delay in the start of counting to 10 days from the standard 3 days.  
The matching results and countable locations are in Table 35 and Table 36. 
 
Table 35 – Matching Results: χ2 and Yield, Optimized Detector Target Rod Set, 800 
meter Minimum Distance, 60 degree Angle Exclusion, 10 Day Delay in Counting 
    χ2 value 
    Unknown Weapon 






FM 0.56 3962 296 3.11 3.16 
FUS 75.87 0.19 980 599 283 
LB 78.44 2185 0.05 283 229 
WPu 2.41 4739 321 0.20 3.68 
WU 1.84 4604 274 2.24 0.17 
 
      
       
    Yield 






FM 15.0 kt 100.2 Mt 144.3 kt 5.2 Mt 3.4 Mt 
FUS 0.01 t 15.0 kt 0.06 t 2.0 kt 1.3 kt 
LB 1.7 kt 138.3 Mt 15.0 kt 682.9 kt 427.5 kt 
WPu 0.04 t 290.8 kt 0.41 t 15.0 kt 9.7 kt 
WU 0.07 t 450.7 kt 0.62 t 23.2 kt 15.0 kt 
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This set of triple restrictions does reduce the matching chi-squared scores of the incorrect 
spectra (demonstrating less discrimination), especially between FM and the two Watt 
spectra.  However, note that the yield scaling factor still reflects that FM is a terrible match 
for the two Watt spectra.  The chi-squared score does not stand alone; the yield factor 
sometimes clearly distinguishes what chi-squared cannot. 
 The long delay in counting makes distinguishing these spectra dependent on the 
sensitive non-threshold reactions, and only tantalum and gold are able to contribute on all 
five spectra, though they do so with a healthy number of countable locations as seen below 
in Table 36: 
 
Table 36 – Countable Locations, Optimized Set, 800 meter Minimum Distance, 60 
degree Angle Exclusion, 10 Day Delay in Counting 
  Countable Locations 
  FM FUS LB WPu WU 
Ti  0 10 0 0 0 
Cr  0 13 0 8 7 
Co  0 15 0 9 7 
Ni  0 14 0 2 0 
Hf  0 20 7 17 15 
Ta  10 20 13 20 20 
W   0 20 2 13 11 
Au  13 20 17 20 20 
 
 
The inclusion of gold is especially valuable in scenarios like this where activations are 
more difficult to obtain and count rates more difficult to obtain for longer decay times.  In 
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the fog and friction in the aftermath of an unexpected nuclear event, gold provides a 
backstop to maximize the amount of usable, reliable data available from AFIDS.  The 
increased masses of hafnium, tantalum, and tungsten allow them to contribute as well. 
 Another way to test the robustness of the optimized target rod set is to increase the 
amount of perturbation applied when generating the unknown spectra.  By default, and in 
every scenario up until now, the perturbation has been made using a gaussian distribution 
based on one standard deviation of injected random error.  This error could be negative or 
positive, and the magnitude follows a bell curve, which larger errors becoming increasing 
less likely.  In the following scenarios, that error will be increased by multiple standard 
deviations. 
 
Table 37 – Matching Results: χ2 and Yield, Optimized Detector Target Rod Set, 2 
Standard Deviation Perturbation 
    χ2 value 
    Unknown Weapon 






FM 0.66 5854 1515 250 259 
FUS 1033 0.50 4408 4337 3889 
LB 698 3399 0.22 2034 1933 
WPu 147 6597 2469 0.50 9.19 
WU 137 6685 2266 8.80 0.50 
 
      
       
    Yield 






FM 15.1 kt 141.4 Mt 320.4 kt 4.9 Mt 3.2 Mt 
FUS 0.01 t 15.0 kt 0.35 t 2.6 kt 1.8 kt 
LB 1.1 kt 114.6 Mt 15.0 kt 1.0 Mt 532.8 kt 
WPu 0.05 t 472.4 kt 1.3 kt 15.0 kt 9.7 kt 
WU 0.07 t 777.1 kt 2.0 kt 23.3 kt 15.0 kt 
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Doubling the amount of perturbation does not significantly affect the matching scores or 
reliability for the optimized detector target rod set.  The noise does appear in the slight 
increase of matching score for the diagonal of correct matches. 
 
Table 38 – Matching Results: χ2 and Yield, Optimized Detector Target Rod Set, 5 
Standard Deviation Perturbation 
    χ2 value 
    Unknown Weapon 






FM 4.07 5856 1508 253 265 
FUS 1011 3.11 4400 4335 3892 
LB 716 3401 1.38 2039 1923 
WPu 143 6599 2459 3.12 12.37 
WU 134 6686 2257 11.95 3.09 
 
      
       
    Yield 






FM 15.2 kt 141.1 Mt 320.0 kt 4.9 Mt 3.2 Mt 
FUS 0.01 t 15.0 kt 0.35 t 2.6 kt 1.8 kt 
LB 1.1 kt 114.6 Mt 15.0 kt 1.0 Mt 531.9 kt 
WPu 0.05 t 471.6 kt 1.3 kt 15.0 kt 9.8 kt 
WU 0.07 t 775.8 kt 2.0 kt 23.3 kt 15.1 kt 
 
Increasing the amount of intentionally introduced error to 5 standard deviations expected 
begins to have an effect on the diagonal of correct matches.  Each of the scores is in the 
single digits, but all are now above 1, which is the rough threshold for a very close match.  
The combination of chi-squared with the yield scaling factors is still sufficient to 
discriminate between the spectra, albeit with less confidence than before. 
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Table 39 – Matching Results: χ2 and Yield, Optimized Detector Target Rod Set, 10 
Standard Deviation Perturbation 
    χ2 value 
    Unknown Weapon 






FM 16.08 5861 1499 262 279 
FUS 979 12.46 4388 4335 3898 
LB 750 3406 5.55 2051 1910 
WPu 142 6605 2444 12.43 22.38 
WU 134 6691 2244 22.33 12.32 
 
      
       
    Yield 






FM 15.3 kt 140.6 Mt 319.3 kt 4.9 Mt 3.2 Mt 
FUS 0.01 t 15.0 kt 0.35 t 2.6 kt 1.8 kt 
LB 1.2 kt 114.7 Mt 14.9 kt 1.0 Mt 531.2 kt 
WPu 0.05 t 470.4 kt 1.3 kt 15.1 kt 9.8 kt 
WU 0.07 t 773.8 kt 2.0 kt 23.4 kt 15.1 kt 
 
With a 10 standard deviation error range, the chi-squared scores start to suffer, especially 
in distinguishing the two Watt spectra.  These two spectra can be distinguished at this point, 
but with less confidence than before since their correct match scores now exceed 10 and 
are more than half of the nearby incorrect matches. 
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Table 40 – Matching Results: χ2 and Yield, Optimized Detector Target Rod Set, 30 
Standard Deviation Perturbation 
    χ2 value 
    Unknown Weapon 






FM 137 5924 1487 359 396 
FUS 896 112 4351 4378 3962 
LB 940 3441 50.45 2130 1899 
WPu 205 6668 2404 111 120 
WU 191 6745 2213 127 109 
 
      
       
    Yield 






FM 16.2 kt 139.4 Mt 317.3 kt 5.0 Mt 3.3 Mt 
FUS 0.01 t 15.0 kt 0.34 t 2.7 kt 1.8 kt 
LB 1.3 kt 115.8 Mt 14.9 kt 1.1 Mt 537.1 kt 
WPu 0.05 t 468.0 kt 1.3 kt 15.3 kt 10.0 kt 
WU 0.08 t 769.3 kt 2.0 kt 23.8 kt 15.4 kt 
 
At this point, the matching chi-squared analysis breaks down, producing no reliable results 
due to the excessive noise.  The failure is most pronounced between the two Watt spectra 
as well as FM.  Thirty standard deviations create a truly high error level.  Even at this 
extreme, the optimized set reliably discriminates between fusion and fission spectra. 
 A parallel analysis of the relative contributions of each element was conducted; the 
relative contributions remained steady as the noise increased.  No element was particularly 
good or bad at handling noise. 
 Considering the magnitude of noise progressively introduced in the spectra, the 
optimized detector target rod set was fairly robust up through 5 standard deviations of 
noise.  This is very satisfactory performance.  The optimized set for this particular set of 
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weapons leakage spectra will function well in a wide variety of circumstances while 
meeting all budget limits and other constraints. 
 It is again worth stating that this optimized set is not a generalized solution for all 
neutron spectra or all nuclear weapons neutron leakage spectra.  A generalized approach 
for optimizing for a larger and more varied spectra set is discussed in the conclusions 





CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS 
 This research effort thus far has demonstrated an approach to optimizing the 
detector target rods selected for an AFIDS-type detector, for the specific case of 5 
unclassified weapons neutron leakage spectra.  For these 5 spectra, most analysis could be 
conducted over 5 x 5 matrices with a manageable 25 data points for a typical scoring table.  
At this scale, the optimization can largely be completed manually with individual attention 
paid to each combination of spectra. 
5.1 Differences for Real-World Applications 
 For real-world applications of AFIDS and other neutron activation detectors, the 
spectra search space will be significantly larger.  The US Government has developed and 
deployed over 70 nuclear weapon warhead designs in its history, with 7 types currently 
deployed as of 2016. [15]  The former Soviet Union / modern day Russia also had a robust 
weapons development program and there are multiple other declared nuclear weapons 
states.   
 Anticipating this larger search space, all techniques and codes were built and tested 
against a matrix of 125 x 125 spectra (consisting of the 5 unclassified spectra repeated 25 
times each with slightly different names).  In multiple parts of the modeling and analysis 
code, the computational time required goes up with this squared matrix value, but still runs 
in less than a day on a personal computer. 
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 The biggest difference is not computing time, however.  When optimizing for a 
much larger set of spectra, it will not be practical to analyze every single cell by hand.  
Even the matching chi-squared tables will take multiple pages to print unless they are 
reduced to a heatmap.  Therefore, the built-in analysis tools of the code, such as summing 
of chi-squared score contributions by element, detector location, and spectra combinations 
are critical to creating an optimized detector target rod set that covers a much larger search 
space. 
 The spectra themselves will not only be more numerous, but also different 
qualitatively.  There are pure fission weapons to consider, but also fusion boosted weapons 
and staged weapons that combine fission, fusion, and fission stages. [15]  The spectra will 
have a greater mix of energy distributions, and will lack the clear difference between a pure 
hypothetical 14.1 MeV peak that the unclassified FUS spectrum modelled.  However, more 
weapons will have high energy neutrons that threshold reactions will be able to capture.  
Automated tallies and summations must be used to determine the utility of each element in 
this more varied search space. 
5.2 Generalized Approach to Optimization 
5.2.1 Additional Optimization Criteria 
 The analysis that led to the optimization criteria detailed in section 4.3.1 (page 110) 
will hold true for the larger and more varied spectra data sets.  In addition, some new 
criteria are added: 
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11. The spectra library set should be narrowed down to only the spectra that it is 
important to distinguish between.  For example, the US nuclear warhead designated 
B61 had a total of 12 modifications (Mods).  Each Mod incorporated the same base 
design but “incorporated a few different components that changed the operational 
characteristics of the weapon in a significant way”. [15]  The reasons for these 
Mods include incorporating the warhead into different delivery systems.  
Distinguishing between minor modifications is not as important and should not be 
considered valuable in the optimization process.28  (These spectra must be culled 
carefully, as a change of delivery system could affect the leakage spectrum 
significantly.) 
12. Special attention must be paid to any spectra that leads to a limited number of 
countable locations, either in absolute numbers, or only creating sufficient counts 
for a single target element.  This could drive optimization decisions to increase the 
mass multiplier of other elements in order to increase the breadth of coverage. 
13. Matching chi-squared scores should show rough degrees of similarity between 
spectra that are related but different.  For instance, a pure fission gun-type device 
should have a very different score than a modern US thermonuclear staged weapon.  
However, two fission gun-type devices with similar materials but different 
components and casings should produce a much lower score. 
                                                 
 
28 Trimming unnecessary spectra search space also allows for easier manual analysis and 
reduced computational time, memory and storage requirements. 
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14. The angular effects from the detector body shielding should be mitigated to the 
extent possible by placing multiple copies of the same element in offset angular 
locations within the detector body.  Single target rods should be split in half and set 
180 degrees apart to create some diversity in angle. 
15. To address the likely bottlenecks in the counting process, unnecessary elements 
should not be included just for the sake of variety or to fill up all the slots.  
Alternatively, inexpensive materials of lower value can be included but have a low 
priority for counting.  Additionally, duplicates of good materials can lead to faster 
counting times. 
5.2.2 Element Screening and Selection Method 
 The thought process behind the screening of potential elements discussed in 
sections 4.3 (page 110) can be generalized for larger and different spectra sets.  For an 
AFIDS-style optimization problem, the two major constraints are budget and target rod 
slots available (and the closely-related problem of counting throughput). 
 The budget constraint is most important for a handful of expensive elements like 
iridium, rhenium, gold and cobalt.  The utility of each of these elements versus their cost 
should be determined first and decisions made on whether to include them and in what 
quantity.  If the decision is not clear, then multiple courses of action can be considered with 
or without those specific expensive elements.  The decisions made here narrow the budget 
space in a way that needs to be made upfront.  They do not tend to take up many target 
slots. 
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 Next, elements with high utility but that would benefit greatly from additional mass 
in order to reach higher numbers of countable locations should be considered.  Tables 
similar to Table 30 (page 120) should be generated, with summation tallies used to show 
the overall effect of each additional mass portion.  Plateaus should be sought out, and 
additional mass added only in sufficient quantity to capture the largest gains in degree of 
freedom with the minimal slot usage.  If spare slots and money are available at the end of 
the process, these tables can be revisited to distribute the remaining space and material 
costs optimally to capture as many gains as possible. 
 With the number of available slots reduced, the remaining elements should be 
handled in an order that focuses on covering the gaps in utility left by the currently selected 
elements.  These could be gaps in distinguishing low or high energy spectra, providing 
threshold reactions, or providing long-lasting counts from activation products with longer 
half-lives, or any combination of the above.  There could also be a few specific spectra 
types that are difficult to count or distinguish that could be targeted by specific remaining 
elements. 
 When the available target rod slots are exhausted, increases in mass by increased 
diameters should be considered, subject to budget constraints and diminishing returns.  
There is certainly value in designing an optimized set below budget, but overall utility 
should be prioritized. 
5.2.3 Testing of Optimized Sets 
 If a single optimized set is decided on, it should be tested via scenarios that push 
the limits on the conditions in which it can reliably distinguish spectra.  If multiple courses 
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of action are being considered, these same tests can help determine the best course of action 
by finding which optimized set is able to perform with the most restrictions and the most 
injected noise.   
 Tests should include distance, angle, and time constraints similar to Table 36 (page 
130).  Any noticeable deficiencies in this test should be corrected by changing elements 
and mass multipliers to the extent possible.  Further tests should inject increasing amounts 
of noise in a fashion similar to those done starting in Table 37 (page 131).  A key decision 
criterion between competing optimized sets is how much noise they can handle while still 
successfully distinguishing spectra.  Again, localized failures should be examined and 
mitigated if small changes in the overall optimized set can fill the gaps.  
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CHAPTER 6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 This chapter contains recommendations for future work and studies to be 
conducted.  These recommendations focus on both improving the information used to 
model and optimizing the AFIDS-style neutron activation detectors and topics generated 
from this research that are outside of its immediate scope but useful to improving the 
overall AFIDS system. 
6.1 Angular Dependence of Flux 
 As described, modelled, and experimentally verified in sections 3.1.1.3 (page 32) 
and 4.1.1.2 (page 71), there is a measurable impact on the incoming flux spectra determined 
by the angular position of a target rod versus the direction the radiation is primarily coming 
from.  While these effects have been modelled and correction factors generated, the model 
used makes the assumption that the flux in monodirectional from a nearby planar source.  
In reality, many of the neutrons will scatter and change directions before reaching the 
detector.  These scatters are accounted for in the pre-calculated transport of the spectra 
from the detonation site to the detector sites; however, these transported spectra do not 
provide any information about the directional distribution of the flux. 
 Due to the size and complexity of the city model, it was impractical to re-run the 
MCNP transport without use of a supercomputer.  The transport data provided were 
sufficient to conduct this research; further refinement and understanding of the angular 
effects, including both improved modeling and mitigation, will require these runs to be 
recomputed with a tally system that captures the directional distribution of the flux. 
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6.2 Optimizing Detector Placement to Minimize Noise 
 Part of this research considered the effects of height above ground on the flux 
received by the detectors.  The theory is that detectors placed further from the ground and 
possibly above the majority of the urban terrain will have less noise introduced into the 
flux that reaches them – the flux will generally undergo fewer scattering events.  While 
there will still be urban terrain effects for some detectors, especially if the detector is in the 
“shadow” of a building near the detonation, those effects will be less complex, less 
numerous, and easier to accurately model. 
 There are certainly trade-offs incurred by placing detectors in high places.  They 
are more expensive to install, requiring specialized crews to be hired to install in places 
like cell phone towers and skyscrapers.  They are more difficult to check on during a 
maintenance cycle.  Importantly, they may be especially difficult to recover in the 
immediate aftermath post-blast.  However, if the quality of their signal is significantly 
better than detectors close to the ground, these costs may be worth it. 
 Moving the detector locations (as opposed to filtering by height) was beyond the 
scope of this research.  It would also require calculating additional city-level MCNP 
transports to new locations, requiring a supercomputer.  But this work could determine the 
efficacy of placing detectors in high places and drive planning that will improve AFIDS 
performance in a manner distinct from picking the optimum target rod set. 
 Nothing in the AFIDS approach requires permanent, static installations.  Detectors 
could be brought and temporarily emplaced at high-profile events at a minimal cost.  They 
could even be fielding with military units overseas to collect data in the event of a nuclear 
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strike.  Only their locations at the time of the strike are required to do the transport 
calcuations. 
6.3 Determining the Optimal Counting Parameters 
 During this research, an optimized set of target rods was developed that proved to 
be very robust against intentionally introduced noise in the unknown spectra, performing 
well with five standard deviations of noise randomly added.  The research assumed a static 
counting criterion of 3 hours with a minimum of 3,000 total counts.   
 The total count quantity is driven by reducing the statistical error in counting, which 
is proportional the square root of the number of counts.  The 3 hours is an estimate based 
on maintaining throughput at the limited counting setups available to handle perhaps 
dozens of detectors recovered with up to 20 rods each.  The 3 hour limit serves to both limit 
decay of short-lived activation products and to provide results to national authorities in as 
timely of manner possible. 
 Given the robustness demonstrated in this study, both the number of minimum 
counts and the time allowed bear reconsideration and further study.  Reducing the 
minimum number of counts required increases potential statistical error, but also increases 
the number of countable locations, especially for threshold elements in low yield scenarios.  
Changing the time limit to a shorter quantity would allow greater throughput, though 
shortening the time also reduces the number of countable locations. 
 One possible solution, especially with a target rod set containing fewer numbers of 
different elements, would be to have a counting plan that is not static.  Rather, the counting 
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is actively monitored, and samples reaching the minimum counts required early are pulled 
out and the next samples are placed in.  In this setup, the time to reach the minimum counts 
is used to calculate the initial activation levels instead of the counts in a static time.  This 
active monitoring may also help filter out elements that are clearly not on pace to reach the 
minimum count requirement in the time available, freeing up the counting system to focus 
on elements with countable quantities remaining. 
 Another approach would incorporate higher-efficiency detectors like sodium 
iodine.  While sacrificing energy resolution, the gain in absolute efficiency could both 
speed the counting and allow some isotopes to have additional countable locations.  
Sodium iodine detectors are also less expensive, do not require cooling, and are available 
in greater quantities at universities with nuclear programs.  They could also be used to 
triage incoming target rods to be counted, to eliminate those that will be uncountable and 
prioritize those that need to be counted quickly before losing their count rate. 
 A coincidence counting system could also help improve counting throughput at a 
lower cost, especially if a mobile counting laboratory is fielded for AFIDS.  Using 
coincidence allows for good signal to be derived with far less shielding than would 
otherwise be required, reducing weight and cost requirements. 
 Finally, agreements with institutions like research universities that have 
sophisticated counting laboratories could bring those assets to bear on the counting 
throughput problem.  There would be some cost, training, and testing associated with this, 
but the return would be high versus the investment required. 
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APPENDIX A. SAMPLE CALCULATIONS 
 This appendix shows sample calculations for each major computation executed in 
the FORTRAN codes supporting the inverse optimization process.  Assumptions are stated 
before each problem, and explored, discussed, and validated after the problem when 
appropriate. 
A.1 Post-Detonation Activation Level in Target Rod 
 This computation takes a known neutron fluence (in a specific energy group) that 
has already been transported to the location of the target rod and calculates the number of 
activations that will occur from that energy bin.  To calculate the total activity, it is then 
necessary to sum all energy bins for that fluence and material. 
A.1.1 Variables 
 Nact ≡ Number of activations present in the target rod after the brief fluence from 
the detonation event in a specific energy group, number.  [Calculated quantity] 
Φ ≡ Incoming neutron fluence from a selected energy bin (already transported from 
the detonation site to the target rod site), number of neutrons.   
 σ ≡ The effective microscopic cross section from a selected energy bin for the 
specific desired reaction, barns (10-24 centimeters2). 
 m ≡ Mass of the target rod, calculated from its density and volume, grams. 
 Abundance ≡ Portion of mass that is the specific desired isotope, fraction. 
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 A ≡ Average atomic weight of the element of the target material (isotope specific), 
grams/mole. 
 NA ≡ Avogadro’s Number: number of atoms per mole. 
A.1.2 Assumptions 
1. The self-shielding effect of the target rod is negligible: a central or far-side atom is 
as likely to have a reaction as the leading edge since very few neutrons of the 
incoming fluence are consumed in the reactions prior to reaching the middle and 
far sides. 
2. The time in which the fluence is delivered to the target material is very short 
compared to the target reactions half-life for gamma emission. 
A.1.3 Givens 
For this sample calculation, an unclassified spectrum from the “Fat Man” nuclear 
explosion at Nagasaki is used for some source data.  Specifically, detector location 16 is 
selected, with the 186W(n,g) reaction and the 6703200 eV energy bin used for the sample 
calculation.  A 15-kt yield is assumed. 
Φ = 1.99223e8 neutrons/(centimeter2*kt) 
σ = 0.05202200102 barns 
 d = 0.10 centimeters 
 l = 5.00 centimeters 
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m = 0.7559458 grams 
 Abundance = 0.2843 
 A ≡ 185.95 grams/mole 
 NA ≡ 6.022140857e+23 atoms/mole 
A.1.4 Physics / Equation 
The major equation in this step of the calculation relates the number of activations 
to the other variables: 
𝑁𝐴𝑐𝑡 = Φ ∗ ⁡σ ∗ (
𝑚 ∗ 𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝐴
) ∗ 𝑁𝐴 
A.1.5 Results 











) ∗ 6.022140857e23⁡atoms/mol 
Cancelling units and calculating results in: 
𝑁𝐴𝑐𝑡 = ⁡108203.19⁡activations in this energy bin 
This matches the output of the FORTRAN program.  The FORTRAN program then sums 
over all the discrete energy bins to total the activation of the target rod. 
 149 
A.1.6 Assumption Validation 





𝑁 = 9.96115e7⁡neutrons  
(N >> Nact) 
The number of neutrons interacting (causing activations) with the target rod (for 
this particular reaction) is much less than the amount of incoming fluence, so the 
assumption is valid. 
2. The times for arrival of prompt neutrons are measured in milliseconds or 
microseconds; the half-lives of all elements considered are much larger than this, 
so decay during the initial fluence is negligible. 
A.2 Remaining Activation Level at a Given Time 
The number of activated products immediately after the time of detonation must be 
adjusted for the radioactive decay that occurs before counting begins. 
A.2.1 Variables 
N(t) ≡ Number of activated atoms at a given time [Calculated quantity] 
N0 ≡ Number of activated atoms at time zero, previously calculated. 
λ ≡ Decay constant of the product isotope of interest (1/hour) 
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t ≡ Time (hour) 
A.2.2 Givens 
N0 = 108203.19 activations 
λ = 0.028881133 1/hour 
t = 24.0 hours 
A.2.3 Physics / Equation 
𝑁(𝑡) = 𝑁0 ∗ 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡 
A.2.4 Results 
Substituting in given values yields: 






N(t) = 1.242e10 activations at time = 24.0 hours  
A.3 Count Rate at a Given Time 
The primary directly-measured quantity post-detonation is the count rate of the 
individual target rods at a given time.  This count rate is a function of the activity level of 
the target rod, the number of gammas per decay for the gamma ray being counted, the 
probability that gamma ray escapes from the target rod, and the absolute efficiency of the 
detector setup used at that energy level. 
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A.3.1 Variables 
C(t) ≡ Count rate at a given time (counts/hour) [Calculated quantity] 
λ ≡ Decay constant (1/hour) 
N(t) ≡ Number of activated atoms at a given time 
γi ≡ Number of gamma rays emitted per decay event; only including gamma rays 
from the best gamma ray selected 
pesc ≡ Probability that a given gamma ray escapes from the target rod 
εabs ≡ Absolute efficiency of the detector for the chosen gamma ray 
A.3.2 Givens 
λ = 0.028881133 1/hour  
N(t) = 1.242e10 activations at time = 24.0 hours 
γi = 0.1355 
pesc = 0.811923 at this gamma energy for this Z target rod 
εabs = 0.272595 at this gamma energy 
A.3.3 Physics / Equation 
𝐶(𝑡) = 𝜆𝑁(𝑡) ∗ 𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑐 ∗ 𝜀𝑎𝑏𝑠 
A.3.4 Results 
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) (1.242e10) ∗ 0.1355 ∗ 0.811923 ∗ 0.272595 
Result: 
C(t) = 1.0757e7 counts/hr 
The negative sign indicates that the number of activated particles is decreasing with time. 
A.4 Maximum Delay Time to Start Counting 
This calculation determines how long of a delay can pass while still allowing the 
minimum count threshold to be reached in the allotted counting time.  This calculation is 
done on a by-reaction basis, which then can be used to determine the overall maximum 
delay for a starting element.  (Within the reaction, the best product gamma ray is selected 
for analysis.) 
A.4.1 Variables 
tmd ≡ Maximum delay time before counting starts that yields the minimum required 
counts. [Calculated quantity] 
Cmin ≡ minimum allowed counts in counting time tc 
Nact ≡ Number of activated atoms at time zero, previously calculated 
λ ≡ Decay constant of the product isotope of interest (1/hour) 
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γi ≡ Number of gamma rays emitted per decay event; only including gamma rays 
from the best gamma ray selected 
pesc ≡ Probability that a given gamma ray escapes from the target rod 
εabs ≡ Absolute efficiency of the detector for the chosen gamma ray 
A.4.2 Givens 
Cmin = 1000 counts 
N0 = 2.484e10⁡ atoms 
λ = 0.028881133 1/hour 
γ/decay = 0.1355 
pesc = 0.811923 at this gamma energy for this Z target rod 
εabs = 0.272595 at this gamma energy 
A.4.3 Physics / Equation 
𝑡𝑚𝑑 =
ln [
𝑁𝑎𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑐 ∗ 𝜀𝑎𝑏𝑠
𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛








2.484e10 ∗ 0.1355 ∗ 0.811923 ∗ 0.272595











tmd = 344.934 hours  
A.5 Counts in a Given Time 
This calculation determines the expected number of counts from radioactive decays 
from a given reaction, given a set delay time and counting time.  Within the reaction, the 
best product gamma ray is selected for analysis. 
A.5.1 Variables 
C(T,t) ≡ Counts registered, starting at time T post-detonation and counting for t 
hours. [Calculated quantity] 
N0 ≡ Number of activated atoms at time zero, previously calculated 
λ ≡ Decay constant of the product isotope of interest (1/hour) 
γi ≡ Number of gamma rays emitted per decay event; only including gamma rays 
from the best gamma ray selected 
pesc ≡ Probability that a given gamma ray escapes from the target rod 
εabs ≡ Absolute efficiency of the detector for the chosen gamma ray 
A.5.2 Givens 
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T = 72.0 hours 
t = 3.0 hours 
N0 = 2.484e10 atoms 
λ = 0.028881133 1/hour 
γi = 0.1355 
pesc = 0.811923 at this gamma energy for this Z target rod 
εabs = 0.272595 at this gamma energy 
A.5.3 Physics / Equation 
𝐶(𝑇, 𝑡) = (𝑁0 ∗ 𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑐 ∗ 𝜀𝑎𝑏𝑠)(𝑒
−𝜆𝑇)(1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡) 
A.5.4 Results 
Substituting in given values yields: 
𝐶(𝑇, 𝑡) = 2.484e10 ∗ 0.1355 ∗ 0.811923
∗ 0.272595)(𝑒−0.028881133∗72.0)(1 − 𝑒−0.028881133∗3.0) 
Result: 
C(T,t) = 7.7284e6 counts 
A.6  Chi-Squared Calculation (local value) 
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This calculation determines the chi-squared contribution of a given library spectra, 
measured spectra, detector location, reaction, and energy bin combination.  This is the 
fundamental quantity used in scoring spectra against each other and is summed over all the 
detector location/target element combinations that are countable locations.  The Chi-
Squared value depends on a scaling factor equal to the yield of the measured spectra, which 
is searched for using a Golden Section Search in the code.  The search seeks to minimize 
the total Chi-Squared value for a given library spectra / measured spectra combination; for 
purposes of the sample calculation, a single value is tested. 
A.6.1 Variables 
χ2s
 ≡ Chi-Squared value, used to determine how good of a statistical fit two different 
spectra are.  This quantity depends on 4 independent variables (library spectra activations, 
measured spectra activations, detector location, and reaction) plus a scaling factor (yield) 
which is used to minimize the overall Chi-Squared value. [Calculated quantity] 
F ≡ Degrees of freedom – determined by the number of valid detector 
location/reaction combinations for the two spectra being compared.  For the sample 
calculation, a single degree of freedom is tested.  Note than F is bounded by F ≤ D*J. 
d ≡ detector location index 
D ≡ number of detector locations 
j ≡ reaction index 
J ≡ number of reactions 
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ys ≡ library spectrum yield (in kt); used as a scaling factor to minimize overall chi-
squared 
Bsdj ± usdj ≡ The library reference spectrum’s activation level and uncertainty at a 
given detector location for a given reaction.  This library spectra are produced assuming a 
1.0 kt yield, which lets ys serve as a scaling factor to match the measured spectrum’s 
activations. 
Mdj ± σdj ≡ The measured spectrum’s activation level and uncertainty at a given 
detector location for a given reaction. 
A.6.2 Givens 
This sample calculation uses the Watt-Pu spectrum (s=4) as the library 
spectrum and the Fusion spectrum (s=2) as the measured spectrum. 
F = 1 (to just look at the contribution to chi-squared from one measured target 
rod/reaction for this sample calculation; summation of multiple degrees of freedom is a 
trivial calculation.) 
d = detector location 32 
D = 34 detector locations 
j = Reaction 1433, (186W(n,γ)187W).  (Note: the vast majority of possible 
reactions will have 0 contribution to Chi-Squared due to being filtered out.) 
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J = 1691 reactions (not used) 
ys = 42400 kt (large quantity due to two very different spectra) 
Bsdj ± usdj = 1.6461e7 ± 1.7016e5 activations 
Mdj ± σdj = 3.0158e9 ± 1.54484e6 activations 































χ2s  = 9277.5 
This Chi-Squared score indicates that the library and measured spectra have very 
different activation levels for the reaction/detector location combination, signifying a non-
match. 
A.7  Uncertainty in Measured Activations 
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This calculation determines the absolute uncertainty of the number of measured 
activations.  In this context of this program, the measured activations are originally 
produced by perturbing the library spectra activations and then multiplying by the yield.  
However, in a real scenario, the measured activations would not come from neutron 
transport calculations, but from the number of measured counts from the activated target 
rods.  Therefore, uncertainty for the measured activations is propagated from the number 
of counts at a set time post-detonation and that quantity’s uncertainty. 
A.7.1 Variables 
σ ≡ Absolute uncertainty in measured activations [Calculated quantity] 
C(T,t) ≡ Counts registered, starting at time T post-detonation and counting for t 
hours 
T ≡ Time elapsed post-detonation before counting begins (hours) 
t ≡ Time allowed for counting (hours) 
λ ≡ Decay constant of the product isotope of interest (1/hours) 
γi ≡ Number of gamma rays emitted per decay event; only including gamma rays 
from the best gamma ray selected 
pesc ≡ Probability that a given gamma ray escapes from the target rod 
εabs ≡ Absolute efficiency of the detector for the chosen gamma ray 
A.7.2 Givens 
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This sample calculation uses the Fusion spectrum (s=2) as the measured spectrum, 
and the (186W(n,γ)187W) reaction, with the associated best gamma selected.  Detector 
location 32 is used. 
C(T,t) = 938294 counts 
T = 72.0 hours 
t = 3.0 hours 
λ = 0.028881133 1/hr 
γi = 0.1355 
pesc = 0.811923 at this gamma energy for this Z target rod 
εabs = 0.272595 at this gamma energy 
A.7.3 Physics / Equation 
𝜎 =
√𝐶(𝑇, 𝑡) ∗ 𝑒𝜆𝑇
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑐 ∗ 𝜀𝑎𝑏𝑠 ∗ (1 − (𝑒−𝜆𝑡))
 
A.7.4 Results 
Substituting in given values yields: 
𝜎 =
√938294 ∗ 𝑒(0.028881133⁡1/ℎ𝑟)(72.0⁡ℎ𝑟)




σ = 3.113372e6 activations (uncertainty) 
Nact = 3.0158e9 ± 3.1134e6 
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APPENDIX B. CROSS SECTION PLOTS 
 This appendix includes the cross section plots of the 27 commercially-available 
candidate elements.  The cross sections displayed are for the reaction of most interest when 
applicable; some elements have both their best threshold and no threshold reactions 
displayed separately.  All data comes from the ENDF database. [14] 
 




Figure 18 – Al Cross Section (lin/log) 
 
Figure 19 – Ti Cross Section (lin/log) 
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Figure 20 – Cr Cross Section (log/log) 
 
Figure 21 – Fe Cross Section (log/log) 
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Figure 22 – Co Cross Section (log/log) 
 
Figure 23 – Ni Cross Section (lin/log) 
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Figure 24 – Cu Cross Section (log/log) 
 
Figure 25 – Ge Cross Section (log/log) 
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Figure 26 – Zr Cross Section (log/log) 
 
Figure 27 – Nb Cross Section (log/log) 
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Figure 28 – Mo Cross Section (log/log) 
 
Figure 29 – Rh Cross Section (lin/log) 
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Figure 30 – Pd Cross Section (log/log) 
 
Figure 31 – Ag Cross Section (log/log) 
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Figure 32 – Cd Cross Section (log/log) 
 
Figure 33 – In Cross Section (log/log) 
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Figure 34 – Sn Cross Section (log/log) 
 
Figure 35 – Hf Cross Section (log/log) 
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Figure 36 – Ta Cross Section (log/log) 
 
Figure 37 – W Cross Section (log/log) 
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Figure 38 – Re (Threshold Reaction) Cross Section (lin/log) 
 
Figure 39 – Re (No Threshold Reaction) Cross Section (log/log) 
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Figure 40 – Ir Cross Section (log/log) 
 
Figure 41 – Au (Threshold Reaction) Cross Section (lin/log) 
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Figure 42 – Au (No Threshold Reaction) Cross Section (log/log) 
 
Figure 43 – Pb Cross Section (lin/log) 
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